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Abstract 
 
 The following study examines the history of the seventeenth century Collegiant group in 
the Dutch Republic, focusing on their blending of Spiritualist and Rationalist influences. By 
reading Collegiant Rational Religion through the lenses of social history and the history of ideas, 
the following study makes explicit the ways in which the Collegiants were simultaneously a 
religious and secular movement. Being both religious and secular, the historical example of the 
Collegiant group challenges contemporary distinctions between religion and the secular. 
 Chapter 1 outlines the history of the Collegiants in the context of the seventeenth century 
Dutch Republic, from their first meetings in Rijnsburg in 1619 up to their period of Rational 
Religion. Through an examination of Collegiant ideas and practices, the first chapter describes 
the genesis of the movement after the Synod of Dordrecht, the early millenarian influence, and 
the Spiritualist period of the Collegiant group. 
 Chapter 2 then widens the scope of inquiry by situating the Collegiant group in the Early 
Enlightenment, focusing in particular on the Radical Enlightenment. The second chapter 
advances two concurrent arguments against a teleological reading of the Collegiant transition 
from Spiritualism to Rationalism, each concerned with preserving the dignity of the Collegiant 
blending of Rational Religion, rather than reducing it to a transitory phase on the way to 
Rationalism. The two concurrent arguments against the teleological reading of the Enlightenment 
include (1) the critique of the concept of Enlightenment as a normative ideal as provided by 
critical theory, and (2) the recovery of the role of religion during the Enlightenment period as 
provided by recent revisions to historical scholarship. 
 Chapter 3 narrows the scope of inquiry to the Collegiant transition to Rationalism, 
focusing on the ways in which the Collegiants blended together Spiritualism and Rationalism to 
form a Rational Religion that emphasized the compatibility of faith and reason. Through an 
examination of Collegiants who belonged to the Spinoza Circle and Collegiants who were also 
Mennonites, Chapter 3 concludes by describing the schismatic effect of the Bredenburg dispute 
and the collapse of the blended approach in the late Collegiant Rationalist period.  
 Chapter 4 concludes the study by rethinking the contemporary divide between the 
categories of religion and the secular by drawing parallels between Collegiant Rational Religion 
and the contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion, the latter of which is represented by 
theologian and philosopher Daniel Colucciello Barber. 
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Introduction 
 
 The Collegiants were a diverse association of Protestants who gathered together for 
worship and discussion during the seventeenth century in the urban centres of the Dutch 
Republic. Beginning in Rijnsburg in 1619, Collegiant groups spread to major cities such as 
Amsterdam and Leiden, where they remained until their last meetings in 1791.
1
 A variety of 
Anabaptists, Arminians, Socinians, Remonstrants, Reformed, Chiliasts, and Quakers attended 
Collegiant meetings, and the groups that held regular meetings were called "colleges." Interior 
diversity of membership became one of the defining features of the Collegiant group, along with 
anticonfessionalism, anticlericalism, and their unique meeting format. In Collegiant meetings, 
there was no hierarchical leadership structure, and there were no claims to ecclesial authority. 
Instead, members freely shared their interpretations of scripture and experience as a body of 
equals, speaking from the floor of their meeting rooms rather than from a raised podium or 
pulpit.
2
 Arising from their rejection of clerical authority and written confessions, this practice of 
group discussion became known as "free prophecy."
3
 In the egalitarian nature of free prophecy, 
the Collegiant rejection of hierarchical leadership complemented their theological conviction that 
there was no longer a true visible church of Christ. Instead of thinking of themselves as the one 
true church, the Collegiants understood themselves to be a group of individuals who met together 
in order to be guided by the Spirit.
4
 
 Influenced by the Spiritualism of Sebastian Franck and Caspar Schwenkfeld and the 
Rationalism of Baruch Spinoza and Rene Descartes, the Collegiants were a small but interesting 
extension of the Anabaptist Radical Reformation and the Free Church traditions. The beginnings 
                                                 
1
 Andrew C. Fix, Prophecy and Reason: The Dutch Collegiants in the Early Enlightenment (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), 37. 
2
 Ibid., 169. 
3
 Ibid., 39-40. 
4
 Ibid., 113. 
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of the Enlightenment movement deeply affected both Collegiant thought and practice. 
Throughout the early Enlightenment, the Collegiants shifted from a Spiritualist theology and 
practice that emphasized prophecy and the doctrine of the "inner light," to a Rationalist theology 
and practice that encouraged the personal use of natural reason. In its extreme form, 
characteristic of the late period of the Collegiant group, Rationalism privileged "objective 
thinking, without passion, prejudice or superstition, and without reference to non-variable 
statements such as those of religious revelation."
5
 This shift from Spiritualism to Rationalism 
resulted from the contradictory intellectual and social forces at work in the seventeenth-century 
Dutch Republic. 
In addition to their unique place as a hinge between the Radical Reformation and the 
early Enlightenment,
6
 the Collegiants are important and challenging for contemporary study 
because they defy categorization in three important ways. First, the contemporary terms of 
'religious' or 'secular' do not adequately describe the Collegiant group as a whole. Although they 
began as a religious group in Rijnsburg and ended as a Rationalist group, it would be reductive to 
characterize the Collegiant group as either secular or religious because of their novel blending of 
Spiritualist and Rationalist influences over the course of their history. Apart from their 
Spiritualist beginnings, at no point in their history can the group rightly be called purely secular 
or purely religious. The diverse constitution of the group over time meant that from the middle of 
Collegiant history onward, even a minimal confessional common ground could not be assumed 
among those who gathered. This anticonfessional tendency encouraged the inclusion of a wide 
                                                 
5
 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment. 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 100.  
6
 See Andrew Fix, "Radical Reformation and Second Reformation in Holland: The Intellectual 
Consequences of the Sixteenth-Century Religious Upheaval and the Coming of a Rational World View." Sixteenth 
Century Journal 18.1 (Spring 1987): 63-80. Fix writes that "the Collegiant movement became the center and focus 
of a highly significant development in the evolution of European religious and philosophical thought: the 
transformation of a millenarian and spiritualistic religious world view into an embryonic secular and rationalistic 
philosophy" (63). 
3 
 
variety of people in Collegiant meetings, resulting in an early expression of pluralism and 
tolerance. 
 The Collegiants moved through three distinct stages over the course of their history. They 
began as a group of Remonstrants who met together in Rijnsburg following the Synod of 
Dordrecht (1618-1619), and from the middle of their history onward they blended together 
Spiritualist principles with the Enlightenment Rationalism of Descartes and Spinoza. Although 
the late period of the Collegiants was characteristically Rationalist, even the Cartesian-inspired 
Rationalism of later Collegiant thought is not reducible to our contemporary category of the 
secular because it retained aspects of Rational Religion. 
 Second, the Collegiants deserve study from both the perspective of social history and the 
perspective of the history of ideas. Whereas the history of ideas tradition focuses on intellectual 
patterns and the key individuals who expressed them, social history tends to focus on structural 
shifts and the experiences of common people. The Collegiants call for study from both 
perspectives because they were defined by both an intellectual trajectory in which ideas and 
theological debates were highly valued and a social trajectory that affected the religious 
atmosphere of Dutch society. In order to develop a fair and balanced definition of the Collegiant 
group, the following thesis will attend to both the experience of ordinary Collegiant members, as 
well as the ideas of Collegiant leaders like Galenus Abrahamsz and Pieter Balling. 
 Third, while the development of Collegiant thought and practice unfolded as a movement 
from Spiritualism to Rationalism, it is imperative that this movement not be interpreted 
teleologically, as a transitory means to an end. While it is tempting to reduce the Collegiant 
trajectory to the inevitable outcome of the Rationalism that characterized the final years of the 
group, this study argues that Rationalism was not the only imaginable end of the group. To 
4 
 
characterize the Collegiants using the movement from Spiritualism to Rationalism risks missing 
the importance of their period of Rational Religion during which the forces of both perspectives 
were not only blended together, but explicitly understood as compatible. After focusing on this 
blending throughout, the final chapter will show how Collegiant Rational Religion challenges 
contemporary thinking about the categories of the secular and the religious. 
 
5 
 
Chapter 1 
The Collegiants of the Seventeenth Century Dutch Republic 
Literature Review and Historiographical Challenges 
 The two major English-language sources on the history of the Collegiant group are 
Andrew Fix's book Prophecy and Reason7 and Leszek Kołakowski's essay "Dutch Seventeenth 
Century Anti-confessional Ideas and Rational Religion."
8
 Fix's book is a widely-cited and 
comprehensive treatment of the historical and theological breadth of the Collegiant group. 
Tracing the movement from Spiritualism to Rationalism using secularization as his key category, 
Fix covers all of the major Collegiant thinkers, focusing on Galenus Abrahamsz in the early 
period and Jan Bredenburg in the late period. 
 Whereas Fix is considered to be the authoritative source on the history of the Collegiant 
group, Kołakowski is not as well-known a source, and therefore deserves a more significant 
introduction. In 1963 the Marxist philosopher wrote an article in his native Polish called "The 
Mennonite Anticonfessional Current and Rational Religion." Historian James Satterwhite of 
Bluffton University later translated the essay and published it in two parts in the Mennonite 
Quarterly Review in 1990. Kołakowski eventually developed the original essay into a book, 
which was first published in Polish and then translated into French in 1969.
9
 Some salient 
                                                 
7
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason. 
8
 Leszek Kołakowski, "Dutch Seventeenth Century Anticonfessional Ideas and Rational Religion: The 
Mennonite, Collegiant and Spinozan Connections (Part 1)," trans. James Satterwhite. Mennonite Quarterly Review, 
64 no. 3 (1990), 259-297. And "Dutch Seventeenth Century Anticonfessional Ideas and Rational Religion: The 
Mennonite, Collegiant and Spinozan Connections (Part 2)," trans. James Satterwhite. Mennonite Quarterly Review, 
64 no. 4, 385-416. Major Dutch-language studies include J. C. van Slee's De Rijnsburger Collegianten (Haarlem, 
1895) and H. W. Meihuizen's Galenus Abrahamsz (Haarlem, 1954), along with more general studies such as C. 
B. Hylkema's, Reformateurs (1901), and W.J. Kühler's, Het Socinianisme in Nederland (Leiden, 1912.). See also 
Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 17. 
9
 Leszek Kołakowski, Chrétiens sans Église. La conscience religieuse et le lien confessionnel au XVIIe 
siècle. Trans. Anna Posner (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). The translation also includes a new afterword by Kołakowski. 
Despite being considered an authority by Andrew Fix throughout Prophecy and Reason, Kołakowski's sizeable book 
(824 pages) has not yet been translated into English. 
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sections of the third chapter of Chrétiens sans Église have also been translated into English in the 
collection The Two Eyes of Spinoza, with some partial overlap with the second part of the 
Satterwhite translation.
10
 
 Satterwhite introduces the essay by explaining that Kołakowski was interested in religion 
for more than its usefulness for a reformed anti-Stalinist Marxism. Instead of merely being a foil 
for socialist critique, Kołakowski's interest in religion was present from the beginning of his 
career, and complements his work on modernity.
11
 Satterwhite quotes R. M. Fernandes: 
What attracted him [Kołakowski] to these movements was that they were attempting to 
'realize Christian values without conforming to the rules of ecclesiastical organization. 
They sought a religious practice which would be free from the 'visible' constraints 
attached to Church membership, such as credo, rituals, sacraments, institutional 
sacerdoce, etc. They tried to form a Christian community that would not be a church.'12  
 
The title of Kołakowski's larger study, Chrétiens sans Église, reflects this way of characterizing 
the Collegiants by suggesting that they remained Christians without the traditional ecclesial 
structures of the church. During the time in which this essay was written, Kołakowski researched 
"the relationship between freedom and institutional control ‒ particularly in the context of a 
revolutionary movement."
13
 Kołakowski's attention to the rejection of church authority by the 
Collegiant group is reflective of this interest and colors his interpretation, although not in such a 
way that prevents his work from being useful to the historian, theologian, or philosopher. 
                                                 
10
 Leszek Kołakowski, "Dutch Seventeenth-century Non-denominationalism and Religio Rationalis: 
Mennonites, Collegiants and the Spinoza Connection," in The Two Eyes of Spinoza, and Other Essays on 
Philosophers. Trans. Agnieszka Koakowska. Ed. Zbigniew Janowski. (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 
2004). 
11
 See Chapter 1 in Leszek Kołakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991). 
12
 Satterwhite quoting R.M. Fernandes in Kołakowski, "Dutch Seventeenth Century Anticonfessional Ideas 
and Rational Religion (Part 1)," 261. 
13
 Satterwhite in Kołakowski, "Dutch Seventeenth Century Anticonfessional Ideas and Rational Religion 
(Part 1)," 260. Even the nature of Kołakowski's article is both religious and secular because it concerns itself with a 
religious topic (anticonfessionalism) for secular purposes (extricating Stalinism from Marxism). 
7 
 
 Two historiographical problems arise from these two sources. The first problem is that in 
Prophecy and Reason Fix relies heavily upon the movement from Spiritualism to Rationalism to 
periodize the history of the Collegiants. The use of these two categories, although helpful, risks 
reducing the particular trajectory of the Collegiant movement to the now defunct narrative of the 
secularization thesis.
14
 Fix begins his book by describing the cultural and intellectual milieu 
between 1650 and 1700. The portrait that he paints of the "intellectual transformation" of the 
seventeenth century rests upon the displacement of "the providential religious worldview" by a 
"secular worldview based largely on the foundation of human reason."
15
 Although this narrative 
is true of the Collegiants in particular, sociologists and historians have significantly challenged 
the overall narrative of secularization, and Fix's support of the secularization thesis on the level 
of the Enlightenment in general risks overdetermining the particular secularizing trend of the 
Collegiant group and eclipsing the importance of their period of Rational Religion.
16
 
 The second historiographical problem is that Kołakowski readily intertwines his 
theological and philosophical reflection on the works of the Collegiant leaders with his historical 
description of the group. Therefore, differentiating Kołakowski's historical descriptions from his 
                                                 
14
 According to Callum G. Brown and Michael Snape early definitions of secularization in the 1950s-1960s 
understood secularization to be evident in "the declining institutional strength of religion in state and civil affairs."  
See their "Introduction: Conceptualising Secularisation 1974-2010: the Influence of Hugh McLeod," in 
Secularisation in the Christian World: Essays in Honour of Hugh McLeod. Ed. Callum G. Brown and Michael 
Snape (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 3. Since this early understanding of secularization, scholars such as José Casanova 
have argued that secularization entails "the privatization of religious beliefs and practices," "the privatization of 
religion" in the political sphere, and "the differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science)." See his 
"Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective." The Hedgehog Review (Spring & Summer 2006): 
7-22. Amongst these varieties of secularization the theory of social differentiation has emerged as the most robust 
explanation. See Chapter 4 below for a more detailed explanation of the critique of the secularization thesis.  
15
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 3. 
16
 The conclusion that I draw from the critique of the secularization thesis, and from a close reading of the 
Collegiant movement, is that the Collegiant transition from providential deism to human-oriented rationalism is not 
reducible to the linear decline of religion associated with the term 'secularization.' Fix accounts for this complexity 
in part throughout Prophecy and Reason by attending to the way in which Collegiant Rational Religion rests upon 
the compatibility of religious knowledge and rational knowledge. Despite Fix's nuanced treatment of Rational 
Religion, however, the grand narrative of secularization as the definitive aspect of the Enlightenment remains his 
anchor, and should be treated with suspicion insofar as he risks conflating rationalization with secularization. 
8 
 
theological or philosophical reflections is a challenge when using his work in this context. 
Keeping in mind these two historiographical challenges, this study will endeavor to draw the best 
out of both sources in order to sketch a narrative history of the Collegiant group, and then to 
characterize the group thematically in Chapter 3. 
 
Collegiant Beginnings 
 The broad narrative of Collegiant history stretches from their first meetings in 1618 to 
their last meetings in 1791.
17
 According to Fix, the arc of their thinking was such that they began 
as Spiritualist, millenarian, and apocalyptic Protestants, and then "passed through a stage of 
rational religion before arriving at a secularized philosophical rationalism that found its ultimate 
expression in the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza."
18
 
 In 1618-1619 the national synod of the Reformed Church met to discuss the controversy 
around the doctrine of predestination and the debate between Dutch Reformed theologians 
Franciscus Gomarus and Jacobus Arminius. Whereas Gomarus argued for strict predestination, 
Arminius defended a position that emphasized individual free will. This resulted in a significant 
division in the Dutch Reformed Church. The Remonstrants, also called Arminians, were the 
more moderate arm of this division. The synod decided to remove several hundred Remonstrant 
preachers from their offices across the Dutch Republic.
19
 This resulted in the removal of 
Christopher Sopingius from his role as preacher at the Remonstrant congregation in Warmond. 
Following his removal, the Warmond congregation continued to meet regularly without a 
preacher, an idea suggested by one of their leaders, Gijsbert van der Kodde. This group gathered 
                                                 
17
 Nanne van der Zijpp, "Collegiants." Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia Online. 1956. Web. 13 
Feb 2015. http://gameo.org/index.php?title=Collegiants&oldid=120967 
18
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 3. 
19
 Ibid., 35. 
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together "to read several chapters from the Bible, to pray, and to have a devotional address if 
anyone felt called to speak," and soon two brothers of Gijsbert van der Kodde joined the group.
20
 
 In the twenty years following these first meetings in Rijnsburg, Collegiant groups spread 
across the Dutch Republic but maintained a national center in Rijnsburg that hosted bi-annual 
conferences.
21
 When the meetings grew beyond Rijnsburg, both followers and observers referred 
to the meetings as "colleges" and the adherents as "Collegiants."
22
 As the Collegiant groups 
spread throughout Leiden, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Groningen, and areas of Friesland, the two 
most influential groups arose in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
23
 
 Two major groups influenced the Collegiants during their early years: the Remonstrants 
and the Socinians. The Remonstrants resulted from the Arminian controversy within the Dutch 
Reformed church, and were defined by their "principles of anticonfessionalism, anticlericalism, 
and freedom of conscience."
 24
 Fix writes that "[t]he Collegiants were born, of Remonstrant 
parentage, into this world of religious turmoil."
 25
 The Remonstrants, who remain a small but 
active religious group to this day, had close ties with both the Collegiants and the Mennonites, 
the latter of which provided them with a confession of faith written by the Waterlander Hans de 
Ries.
26
 The anticonfessional Collegiants were influenced by the "pietistic values and practical 
morality" of both the Remonstrants and the Mennonites.
27
 
                                                 
20
 Van der Zijpp, "Collegiants."  
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 38.  
23
 Van der Zijpp, "Collegiants." Nanne van der Zijpp writes that the Collegiant group in Rotterdam held 
meetings until 1787, and the Collegiant group in Amsterdam held meetings up to 1791. See also Kołakowski, 
"Dutch Seventeenth Century Anticonfessional Ideas and Rational Religion (Part 1)," 266.  
24
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 30-33. 
25
 Ibid., 37. 
26
 Nanne van der Zijpp, "Remonstrants." Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia Online. 1959. Web. 
12 Jan 2015. http://gameo.org/index.php?title=Remonstrants&oldid=125998. For an older but comprehensive 
survey see Cornelius J. Dyck, "Hans de Ries: Theologian and Churchman. A Study in Second Generation Dutch 
Anabaptism." PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1962. 
27
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 48. 
10 
 
 The Socinians, on the other hand, influenced the Collegiants in a different way. Fix 
writes that "[t]he Socinian movement derived its name from Laelius and Faustus Socinus, radical 
Italian Protestants whose influence was felt most significantly in the flowering of Polish 
antitrinitarianism during the late sixteenth century."
28
 In 1579 Laelius Socinus journeyed from 
Italy to Poland and contacted a group called the Polish Brethren. In less than two decades, he 
became their leader.
29
 In 1598 Laelius Socinus's works were brought to the Dutch Republic, 
where they influenced the group of dissenters who would later become known as the 
Remonstrants.
30
 Despite this influence, there were major differences between Remonstrants and 
Socinians. Whereas the Remonstrants were anticonfessional and anticlerical, the Socinians were 
distinctly antitrinitarian, and the Socinians argued from the positions of both reason and 
scripture.
31
 The Socinians influenced the Collegiants from their beginnings in Rijnsburg onward. 
In the first meetings of the Collegiants, Socinians were welcomed and their "rational approach to 
biblical interpretation" became very influential in the Collegiant group.
32
 
 From the beginnings of the Collegiant group until midway through their history, major 
Collegiant leaders were influenced by both Remonstrant and Socinian perspectives, which led to 
the combination of their influences on the Collegiant group. Fix writes that "Socinian rationalism 
did not alone create the Rijnsburger rational religion, but it was extremely important in 
reinforcing and elaborating tendencies already present in Collegiant thought."
33
 Despite the 
influence of Socinian thought on the leaders of the Collegiants, not all Collegiants were 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., 137. 
29
 Sarah Mortimer, Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 14. 
30
 Ibid., 25. 
31
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 143. Fix also writes that "In addition to antitrinitarianism, a rejection of the 
deity of Christ and of Christ's satisfaction, pacifism, and a belief in the separation of church and state, the Socinians 
stressed human free will and rationality as well as the central importance of the individual's natural knowledge of 
God" (145). 
32
 Ibid., 42. 
33
 Ibid., 161. 
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Socinians, and "[v]ery few of the Rijnsburgers adopted the fundamental points of Socinian 
theology," although many were accused of it by both the church and the state authorities.
34
 
 
The Early Spiritualist Period 
 Another major influence on the early Collegiant group was the millenarian 
apocalypticism (sometimes called chiliasm) inherited from the Spiritualist groups. Historian 
Geoffrey Dipple writes of the difficulty involved in defining Spiritualism, suggesting that it 
involved a mixture of biblicism and individual connection with the Holy Spirit, often in differing 
proportions.
35
 In the sixteenth century, spiritualists overlapped and mixed with Anabaptists, 
making it difficult to distinguish between the two. Dipple does state that a large part of the 
Spiritualist perspective was "a distrust of religious ceremonies and ecclesiastical ordinances."
36
 
This definition, however provisional, accords with the Collegiant attitude toward the sacraments 
and rejection of institutional structures. Dipple writes further that a characteristic belief of 
Spiritualist Anabaptists was the fallen nature of the church, which also corresponds with the 
Collegiant rejection of the one true visible church.
37
 
 The early Spiritualist influence upon the Anabaptist movement brought apocalyptic ideas 
to the fore for the Collegiant group. This apocalyptic millenarianism, the belief in a penultimate 
age of heaven on earth for one thousand years before the final judgment, was largely accepted in 
the religious milieu of the sixteenth century. Fix writes that "[b]elief in the imminent dissolution 
of the natural world became widespread among Protestants who were themselves repeatedly 
faced with the threat of annihilation at the hands of Catholic powers such as Spain, France, and 
                                                 
34
 Ibid., 161. 
35
 Geoffrey Dipple, "Spiritualist Anabaptists," in A Companion to Anabaptism and Spiritualism,1521-1700. 
ed. James Stayer and John D. Roth (Leiden, Brill, 2006), 259. 
36
 Ibid., 291. 
37
 Ibid. 
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the Holy Roman Empire."
38
 This apocalyptic belief functioned as an important hinge between 
the Spiritualist inheritance of the Collegiants and the eventual Rationalism of the group. Fix 
writes, 
In an age in which the traditional providential Christian worldview was still dominant, it 
would have been extremely difficult for most thoughtful people to make the transition all 
at once from belief in a world infused with the Holy Spirit to a view of the world in 
which the guiding hand of divine authority was largely absent. The chiliastic view of 
history made this transition possible for the Collegiants because it provided a middle 
ground that could be occupied by thinkers who were coming to see the world more and 
more in secular terms but who were not yet able to consider the world's separation from 
divine inspiration as final.
39
 
 
For the Collegiants the millenarian imagination helped to explain their increasingly secular 
experience of the world by locating the absence of divine inspiration in the apocalyptic 
conviction that the last days were at hand. This middle ground made sense of secular experience 
while still expecting the return of Christ. The separation from divine providence that the 
Collegiants experienced at the beginning of the Enlightenment period, alongside their belief that 
there was no true visible church, served as a half-way point for their transition to Rationalism. 
This half-way point was characteristic of Collegiant Rational Religion in a way that was both 
positive and negative. On one hand, the early Spiritualist influence changed the Collegiant 
understanding of the distinction between church and world in such a way that permitted the 
middle and later Collegiant group to see science, culture, and the arts as complementing their 
spiritual and moral lives. On the other hand, the gradual separation from divine providence began 
the process of disenchantment that would eventually characterize their late Rationalist period and 
numeric decline. 
 Apart from the millenarian atmosphere of the early Collegiant group, the greater 
Spiritualist influence rested upon the doctrine of the inner light (an early precursor to the 
                                                 
38
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 63.  
39
 Ibid., 105. 
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doctrine of the same name held by many Quakers). For the Collegiants, the inner light was that 
part of a person that received "perfect religious knowledge as a means of preparing his soul to 
receive God's saving grace."
40
 The Spiritualist idea that the inner light was common to all people 
and needed no external institutional support meant that "[t]he immediate contact with God that 
was the central feature of spiritualism made the visible church and external religion unnecessary, 
and even scripture was considered to be of secondary importance."
41
 
 
Galenus Abrahamsz  
 A major figure in Collegiant thought who represents the movement out of the Spiritualist 
period into the blended period is Galenus Abrahamsz de Haan (1622-1706). Galenus was born in 
Zierikzee and raised in a Mennonite congregation who considered themselves neutral 
(stilstaanders) in the conflict between the Flemish and the Frisians.42 Galenus trained as a 
physician in Leiden from 1642 to 1645, and in 1648 he became the preacher for the United 
Mennonite Church in Amsterdam. Known as the Lamists, the Amsterdam congregation met in 
the church known as Het Lam. In 1649 Galenus declined the offer extended by the moderate 
Waterlanders to cultivate closer ties between their two churches. He turned down this offer to 
connect the United Mennonite Church in Amsterdam with the Waterlander church on the 
grounds that the Waterlanders were too accepting of those who were not Mennonites. However, 
Galenus' position quickly changed under the influence of both his friend Adam Boreel and the 
college that Boreel helped to found. Boreel's influence on Galenus is well-documented. Fix 
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writes that very shortly after he met Boreel at the Amsterdam college, "Galenus had joined the 
college and taken up Boreel's ideas with the zeal of a new convert."
43
 Galenus' view that the true 
church was not present on earth was a direct result of the influence of Boreel and his college.
44
 
This anti-ecclesial view aligned with Galenus' hesitations about the use of ecclesial authority to 
prescribe confessions and represented a departure from earlier restitutionist thinking in 
Anabaptism.
45
 H.W. Meihuizen writes that Galenus' "doubt whether any human being or any 
human authority ever could determine what someone else had to believe was intensified through 
his association with the Collegiants."
46
 This questioning of ecclesial authority, along with the 
anticonfessional position that he found in the colleges, characterized Galenus' perspective until 
late in his life.
47
 
 Soon after he began his leadership role at the Lamist congregation, more conservative 
members began to suspect that Galenus was not as orthodox as they had first thought. Accusing 
him of being a Socinian, some members of the leadership of the Lamist congregation arranged to 
meet with Galenus and his associate David Spruyt to discuss the issue of their heterodox views. 
However, before the meeting could take place in January 1657, Galenus and Spruyt presented 
their "Nineteen Articles," rejecting the possibility of any church rightly claiming to be the "the 
true church of the Lord."
48
 The Lamist leadership disagreed with this position and instead 
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affirmed the importance of confessions in the life of the church.
49
 In response, "Galenus pointed 
out that the martyrs had not died for a faith in which there had been no deviation and that in the 
writings of Menno Simons a change in the concept of the church is noticeable."
50
 This view of 
the interior diversity of the faith of the martyrs accorded with Galenus' positive experience of the 
Collegiant meetings and deeply affected his vision for the Mennonite church. 
 In June of 1660, the compiler of the Martyr's Mirror, Thieleman Jansz van Braght 
convened a conference of Mennonite churches in Leiden. As he had done before in Utrecht, van 
Braght led the synod to a conservative conclusion, in this case deciding that Galenus and Spruyt 
should "give up their views or to discontinue their ministry."
51
 He then "forbade Mennonite 
preachers to preach at Waterlander meetings and denied Waterlander preachers access to 
Mennonite congregations."
52
 Neither Galenus nor Spruyt recognized the authority or legitimacy 
of these demands and instead deferred to the authority of their congregation, in which they 
retained significant support. Kołakowski writes that "the matter ended in 1662 with a provisional 
agreement of mutual tolerance."
53
 An unsteady peace remained until later that year, when 
conflict arose between the Mennonites Pieter van Locren and Samuel Apostool. Whereas van 
Locren agreed with Galenus that God's final judgment would evaluate what a person had done 
more than what they believed, Apostool argued that actions could not earn the satisfaction of 
God. After Galenus became involved "[t]he tumult which resulted from these discussions in the 
pulpit in Amsterdam spread throughout all Mennonite congregations in Holland, and even in 
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foreign countries sides were taken for or against Galenus."
54
 This began the Lammerenkrijgh, or 
the War of the Lambs.
55
 
 Accounts differ regarding the root issue of the split. Whereas Meihuizen argues that the 
split was ultimately caused by a dispute regarding access to the Lord's Supper, van der Zijpp 
states that the conflict centered in the status of the true church and the importance of 
confessions.
56
 The division likely resulted from a measure of both theological conflicts. Galenus 
was prepared to accept into communion anyone who had "lived an irreproachable life," but his 
adversaries had a more restrictive view of the supper and the confessional requirements for 
membership in the Mennonite congregation.
57
 Those opposed to Galenus eventually seceded 
from the Lamist congregation, taking approximately one quarter of the congregants with them. 
This conservative group moved into a building called 'de Zon' (the Sun) and were subsequently 
called the Zonists. Galenus attempted to bring the Zonists back into communion with the Lamist 
church, but he was ultimately unsuccessful. While earlier in his life he had rejected the liberalism 
of the Waterlanders, at this point in the development of his thought he was prepared to merge the 
Lamist congregation with the Waterlanders ‒ a process that concluded in June 1668.
58
 
                                                 
54
 Meihuizen, "Galenus Abrahamsz." 
55
 In his entry on the topic in the Mennonite Encyclopedia, Nanne van der Zijpp writes that "[t]he name is a 
derisive epithet for the unpleasant bickering of the lambs of God, borrowed from one of the innumerable polemics of 
the time." During the conflict, the Lamist congregation split into the liberal supporters of Galenus (retaining the 
Lamist name), and the conservative opposition. Before the split, a conservative leader named  Laurens Hendricksz 
appealed to the courts of the state to have Galenus removed from his position on charges of Socinianism, but was 
ultimately unsuccessful. See Nanne van der Zijpp, "Lammerenkrijgh." Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia 
Online. 1959. Web. 23 Feb 2015. http://gameo.org/index.php?title=Lammerenkrijgh&oldid=111295. See also Fix, 
Prophecy and Reason, 147. 
56
 Van der Zijpp, "Lammerenkrijgh."  
57
 Ibid.  
58
 Galenus also worked to educate Mennonite preachers during that time, which eventually led to the 
creation of the Amsterdam Mennonite Theological Seminary. Throughout his lifetime Galenus published various 
theological tractates. During his early period he co-authored the Olive Branch Confession of Faith (1627), and 
during his late period he authored a catechism for the Waterlander conference. His thought developed from an early 
rejection of the liberal Waterlander tradition, through a lengthy middle period in which his tolerance was at its 
height, to a more qualified and moderate conservatism at the end of his life, relative to the increasingly rationalized 
atmosphere of the late Collegiants (Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 256).  
17 
 
Collegiant Rational Religion 
 The War of the Lambs is significant in the history of the Collegiant group because it 
represents the relationship between Spiritualist Anabaptists and the Collegiant groups connected 
to Galenus. Whereas the early Collegiants were influenced heavily by Spiritualism, the middle 
period of the Collegiant group was characterized by a complementary blending of Spiritualism 
and Rationalism, resulting in a form of "Rational Religion." The unfolding of Galenus' thought 
serves as one prominent example of a Collegiant leader who grew along with the great 
movement from Spiritualism to Rational Religion. Kołakowski writes that during this time, the 
"mixture of rationalist slogans with Christian Spiritualism is an undoubtable indication of the 
'Cartesian invasion' in the area of religious life, and it can be observed in various versions in the 
nonaffiliated Dutch theology of the second half of the [seventeenth] century."
 59
 Representative 
of the advance of the Cartesian Rationalist perspective into Spiritualist discourse was the 
theology of Galenus' Collegiant friend Adam Boreel.
60
 Boreel had influenced Galenus with his 
view that the Christian church "should be an invisible church without organization or 
sacraments."
61
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 Boreel began as a strict biblicist, evident in his 1645 publication Ad legem et  
testimonium, but his mysticism soon took on a Rationalist tone as he sought to use human reason 
to explain and justify the Biblical text. Boreel's "negation of existing religious organizations" 
soon extended to, and became compatible with, the use of reason.
62
 Kołakowski points out a 
significant later work by Boreel that makes "a noteworthy attempt to develop 'rational' arguments 
on the subject of the mystical doctrine of unity with God."
63
 This work is titled The Golden 
Christian Chain (1678) and it developed a syllogistic argument that used both rational and 
scriptural justification to "show that for rational reasons God is the one and only goal of human 
beings, their reason and desire."
64
 This compatibility is a major feature of Collegiant Rational 
Religion. Kołakowski characterizes this aspect of Collegiant thought in general, stating that,  
Belief does not conflict with reason, because everything necessary for salvation is set out 
in Scripture clearly, without giving cause for doubt. No signs, symbols or rituals have the 
power of salvation in and of themselves, nor does belonging to any denomination; only 
internal devotion and living faith — but not fides ex auditu — can lead a person to 
rebirth.
65
  
 
Fix is in agreement with Kołakowski that Rational Religion and its compatibility of belief and 
reason characterized the middle of period of Collegiant development.
66
 In particular, this 
influence of Rationalism on the Collegiants is evident in the works of Petrus Serrarius (1600-
1669) and Daniel de Breen (1594-1664). 
 Serrarius was a close associate of the philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and a 
member of both the Rijnsburger college and the Lamist congregation.
67
 Influenced heavily by 
Galenus' view of the church, Serrarius associated with Adam Boreel and defended the Lamists 
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against the Zonists in his 1659 work The Trampling of the Holy City.68 Serrarius believed in "a 
rational light of discerning and a clearness of understanding,"
69
 while also affirming the truth of 
inner religion against the perceived failure of all churches of his day. He believed that "in such 
times of corruption individual believers could gather together to read and discuss scripture as 
well as to comfort and admonish one another while they awaited the arrival of the millennium."
70
 
Although Serrarius was not a Rationalist like Descartes or Spinoza, his simultaneous millenarian 
and rational priorities do represent the influence of early Enlightenment rationalism on the 
Collegiants. 
 Daniel de Breen was a cofounder of the Amsterdam college with Adam Boreel, and de 
Breen served as the secretary for the Remonstrants at the Synod of Dordrecht in 1618.
71
 
Kołakowski calls him a "pseudo-rationalist chiliast," pointing to the combination of chiliasm and 
Rationalism in his thought.
72
 In regards to this combination Kołakowski first warns that de Breen 
was not simply a Rationalist, but then states that the influence of Rationalism on his thought was 
significant: 
To call de Breen simply a 'rationalist,' even in a religious sense, would certainly be an 
immense exaggeration. It is true that he formulated guidelines for interpreting Scripture, 
guidelines that are commonly called religious rationalism. In these guidelines de Breen 
formulated a general principle by enumerating technical principles of interpretation 
(comparison of texts, citing the author's purpose and the historical circumstances in 
which the text originated, analysis of the writer's style, linguistic analysis, etc.). All of 
this was, of course, based on a fundamental recognition of the sacredness of the Bible. 
This principle was that 'it is not permissible to accept any interpretation of Scripture that 
would contradict common sense, contradict itself or contradict the evidence of the 
external senses.'
73
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Kołakowski's warning is meant to communicate the subtlety of de Breen's thought, but the point 
remains that the coexistence of a biblicist and millenarian view with a rational hermeneutic 
principle demonstrates the compatibility of Rationalist and Spiritualist influences at this moment 
in Collegiant history. 
 As the millenarian and rational elements of Collegiant thought blended together, another 
half-way point emerged. A major connection between the Spiritualism of the early Collegiant 
movement and the eventual blending with Rationalism is the connection between the coming of 
the eschaton and the idea of progress. In his work on the philosophy of history, Karl Löwith 
points out the "hidden dependence of the secular religion of progress on the Christian faith, hope, 
and expectation of progressing toward a final fulfilment of history by judgment and salvation."
74
 
Given this connection, the millenarian expectation of the beginnings of the Collegiant movement 
provided the necessary conditions for the emphasis on human progress in the late period. In the 
interim period, millenarianism served as a half-way point between Spiritualist confidence in the 
presence of God, and the growing Rationalist suspicion that God's providence had weakened. As 
a half-way point of this movement, de Breen's pseudo-rationalist chiliasm is exemplary of the 
ways in which Collegiant Rational Religion encouraged the compatibility of faith and reason. 
Kołakowski helpfully defines the growing Rationalist influence on Collegiant Spiritualism as a 
"religious rationalism… that recommends interpreting the canonical writings in such a way as to 
adapt their contents with the demands of 'natural reason.'"
75
  
 While Galenus had a positive orientation towards the natural world, de Breen held to "the 
idea of a basic antagonism, one not permitting of compromise, between the natural world and the 
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Christian life."
76
 This dualism was a direct result of the millenarian belief that the present world 
would pass away, along with the churches that claimed to be the one true church of God. 
Accepting a dualist view of a "spiritual kingdom" and a "material kingdom" de Breen thought 
that the final judgment would "destroy false religious cults" and "topple all earthly monarchies 
and embrace the whole globe totally."
 77
 In this way he is much more akin to the early 
Spiritualists who influenced the Collegiant group than he is to Galenus on the question of the 
present world.  
 Historian of ideas Ernest Lee Tuveson affirms Löwith's argument that Christian 
millenarian expectation influenced the Enlightenment idea of progress and expands this 
connection by emphasizing the importance of the concept of utopia to the apocalyptic 
imagination.
78
  Kołakowski also connects the millenarian expectation and Rationalist 
hermeneutics of de Breen in particular, with a concept of Christian Utopia. 
And so it is also a most Christian utopia. In relation to religious life it has the same 
function as does a secular utopia in relation to secular life: it expresses the negation of the 
existing state of affairs with the aid of a positive description of the ideal state of affairs. 
To say that Christ will come and establish his kingdom on earth, his true church, is the 
same thing as to declare that no existing religious congregation is under Christ's care 
(from which naturally follows  a suspicion of organized churches in relation to all 
millenarians). For de Breen the idea of a non-affiliated Christianity, purged completely of 
confessions, ecclesiastical organizations, the institution of the ministry and an external 
cult, is particularly linked with dreams of a completely worldly nature: doing away with 
state authority, law and wars, an abundance of worldly goods, mortal people covered with 
mortal joys—such  as health, knowledge, longevity, peace, even splendor.
79
 
 
Kołakowski describes the role of de Breen's Christian utopia by identifying millenarian hope 
with the revolutionary negation of the present condition of the world. In this way Collegiant 
millenarianism is defined by a world-denying orientation, in which the world refers to the 
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present time and place over and against the coming age. This type of utopian world-denial in the 
work of de Breen stands in contrast with the world-affirmation of Galenus, who was concerned 
for the Christian task of acting for the betterment of the world of culture and society. However, 
while de Breen saw a strong division between "the evil temporal world" and "the glories of the 
divine millennium," he simultaneously promoted toleration, "declaring that doctrinal differences 
did not belong to the essentials of religion."
80
 It is striking that Collegiant discourse could 
contain the two contradictory approaches of Galenus and de Breen, and furthermore that de 
Breen's chiliasm influenced Galenus at the Amsterdam college in the years following 1653.
81
  
 Collegiant Rational Religion, in which two different perspectives were compatible and 
complementary, is the focus of the present study for a very specific reason. In the words of Fix, 
the Collegiants "inconsistently combined old and new and lived with contradictions they could 
not overcome."
82
 The major contradiction that Fix alludes to is between Spiritualism and 
Rationalism, which eventually resulted in the eclipsing of the Spiritualist influence by the 
Rationalist influence. Despite this eventual eclipse, Collegiant Rational Religion blended 
together these two perspectives ‒ perspectives that are so often assumed to be incompatible, both 
in the historiography of the Enlightenment and in the present discourse on Christianity, religion, 
and the secular. The following chapter will show the greater historical context within which this 
compatibility was nurtured: the transition to the Enlightenment period.  
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Chapter 2 
The Collegiants in the Radical Enlightenment 
Characterizing the Enlightenment  
 The connection between the word "enlightenment" and "illumination" (Illuminismo in 
Italian, Lumières in French, and Aufklärung in German) reflects the self-understanding of many 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and John Locke.
83
 This common understanding of the 
Enlightenment as illuminating the darkness of superstition has unjustly resulted in the portrayal 
of the Enlightenment period as a "unitary phenomenon" characterized by reason and 
secularization, instead of "a group of capsules or flash-points where intellectual projects changed 
society and government on a world-wide basis."
84
 Instead of seeing the Enlightenment as 
something that can be summarized or characterized singularly, cultural historians now recognize 
the dispersed and interiorly diverse nature of the Enlightenment period, spanning the domains of 
government, political economy, revolution, slavery, gender, science, and religion. 
 Two different perspectives tend to characterize efforts to describe the Enlightenment. On 
one hand, historians tend to describe the Enlightenment as a period in history from the middle of 
the seventeenth century to the late eighteenth century. On the other hand, critical theorists tend to 
critique Enlightenment as a set of principles and major themes such as disenchantment, 
secularization, and instrumental reason.
85
 For the purposes of this study, Enlightenment will refer 
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to the approach of critical theory (without the definite article), and the Enlightenment will refer 
to the approach of cultural history (with the definite article). 
 Both the cultural history of the Enlightenment and the critical theory of Enlightenment no 
longer accept the idea that Reason was the primary characteristic of the Enlightenment, or the 
idea that 'progress' is an unproblematic description of Enlightenment. Instead, through their 
separate critiques, the cultural history of the Enlightenment and the critical theory of 
Enlightenment each demonstrate how reading the history of the Collegiants as a linear movement 
from Spiritualism to Rationalism misses the importance of their middle and later blended period 
of Rational Religion. 
 Whereas Spiritualism was defined by an individual connection with the Holy Spirit, and 
Rationalism a logical and deductive perspective, Rational Religion combined spiritual and 
rational attitudes. In the broad sweep of the Enlightenment period Rational Religion (also called 
"Reasonable Christianity") sought to construe Christian doctrine in such a way that would be 
acceptable to any rational person.
86
 
 The cultural history of the Enlightenment now understands Rational Religion or 
"Reasonable Christianity" to be a major part of the period, contrary to earlier histories that 
identified the Enlightenment with uniform secularization. At the same time, the discourse of 
critical theory critiques Enlightenment reason for its totalizing pursuit of human progress, 
challenging earlier normative theories of Enlightenment such as those of Kant and Hegel.
87
 
Whereas the current historical perspective challenges the teleological reading of the 
Enlightenment as a process of increasing rationalization, the critical perspective challenges the 
normative supremacy of reason in Enlightenment thinking. These two concurrent arguments 
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oppose the reading of Enlightenment history and philosophy that privileges progress and reason, 
therefore reinforcing the importance of Rational Religion by not reducing it to a transitory stage, 
but by granting it a dignity of its own. 
 
Critical Theory and the Concept of Enlightenment 
 In December 1784, Immanuel Kant published a short essay in the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift responding to the question: "Was ist Aufklärung?"88 In the essay, Kant describes 
Enlightenment as a movement towards maturity and autonomy, into freedom and out of 
dependence upon others for understanding. For Kant, the courage required to acquire and 
maintain self-sufficient knowledge must overcome the comfort of tutelage. Kant's essay marked 
an epistemological shift toward understanding true knowing as knowing on one's own, without 
the guidance of others. Kant writes, "[i]f it is now asked whether we at present live in an 
enlightened age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment," meaning that 
while the Enlightenment of society is by no means complete, society is in the process of 
becoming enlightened.
89
 For Kant this process is progress towards universal "free thinking" in 
the public use of one's own reason (in the public sphere), and the simultaneous limitation of the 
private use of one's own reason (in the holding of civil offices).
90
 When Kant upholds 
Enlightenment as freedom from tutelage he emphasizes the free choice of the individual in the 
public use of reason, while also emphasizing obedience to authority in the private use of reason. 
 Two hundred years after the appearance of Kant's essay, the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault responded in an essay of the same title claiming that "modern philosophy is the 
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philosophy that is attempting to answer the question raised so imprudently two centuries ago: 
Was ist Aufklärung?"91 Kant's optimism on the subject of Enlightenment is tempered by 
Foucault's caution in his essay "Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?" Foucault identifies Kant's question 
as being definitive of modern philosophy, and then critiques the linear teleology of Kant's escape 
from tutelage towards a mature humanity. Foucault understands Kant's concept of Enlightenment 
as a way out (Ausgang) of the problematic immaturity of dependence upon authority.92 Whereas 
Kant confidently proclaims reason to be a liberating force, Foucault criticizes reason for having 
become its own kind of bondage. Foucault points out that it is a very modern act to ask Kant's 
question, noting that even the attitude that would seek to be for or against the Enlightenment is a 
kind of "blackmail" that we must free ourselves from.
93
 Instead of obeying the terms of this 
dichotomy, Foucault writes that  
one has to refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and 
authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the 
tradition of its rationalism (this is considered a positive term by some and used by others, 
on the contrary, as a reproach); or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to 
escape from its principles of rationality (which may be seen once again as good or bad). 
And we do not break free of this blackmail by introducing 'dialectical' nuances while 
seeking to determine what good and bad elements there may have been in the 
Enlightenment.
94
 
 
Rejecting the blackmail of the Enlightenment, Foucault suggests that we analyze our historical 
determination through historical inquiry. Joining the philosophical discourse on the meaning of 
modernity Foucault understands "modernity rather as an attitude than as a period of history."
95
 
Similar to the recent historical scholarship on the Enlightenment, Foucault defines Modernity as 
an assemblage of attitudes, rather than as a period that can be characterized by a single descriptor 
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like reason or science. Later in the essay, Foucault tempers this distinction between describing 
the Enlightenment as an attitude or period with the reminder that "[w]e must never forget that the 
Enlightenment is an event, or a set of events and complex historical processes, that is located at a 
certain point in the development of European societies."
96
 
 For Kant, Enlightenment was a positive escape from tutelage, and for Foucault 
Enlightenment was a kind of blackmail that set the conditions of its own debate and too readily 
put reason in service of political power. Rather than being suspicious of Enlightenment's own 
determination of attitudes that would be for or against it, critical theorists Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer wholeheartedly oppose Enlightenment, calling it "totalitarian" in their 
landmark work Dialectic of Enlightenment.97 The Frankfurt School understands modern people 
as subjects of reason, being subjected to reason itself as a form of symbolic governance, 
ironically opposite to the spirit of sapere aude. The first chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment 
develops a rich theory of the major characteristics of the Enlightenment period. For Adorno and 
Horkheimer, the concept of Enlightenment is characterized by a rejection of history, a rejection 
of myth, and a "disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of 
knowledge for fancy."
98
 More than that, for Adorno and Horkheimer Enlightenment thinking 
promotes the principles of domination and control, the association of knowledge with power, the 
rise of technological and instrumental reason, and the reduction of language to "neutral 
counters."
99
 The reductive nature of Enlightenment thinking, for Adorno and Horkheimer, 
diminishes mystery and promotes a kind of rationality characterized by utilitarian ethics and 
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totalitarian absolutes.
100
 In the assessment given by Adorno and Horkheimer, the calculative 
rationality of the modern era springs from the emphasis on science and mathematics that began 
with the disenchanting and demythologizing attitudes of the Enlightenment. Placing 
systematization over narrative or culture, this type of rationality uses reason instrumentally, as a 
means to the end of progress.
101
 
 The critical analysis of the Enlightenment from Kant, to Foucault, to the Frankfurt School 
tends to define Enlightenment in terms of freedom, liberty, autonomy, individualism, rationalism 
(instrumental, utilitarian), disenchantment, and demythologization. This critical tradition 
problematizes any perspective that would uncritically uphold the goals of reason and progress in 
an effort to derive a normative ethic from the Enlightenment. This critical discourse, however, 
has also been accused of critiquing Enlightenment without being sufficiently grounded in the 
history of the Enlightenment period (for example, when Adorno and Horkheimer critique 
Enlightenment rationalism they ignore the positive aspects of the Enlightenment period). The 
critique of Enlightenment reason as a normative ideal necessarily rejects perspectives that 
prioritize reason over religion. In a similar way to this normative critique, contemporary cultural 
historians reject descriptions of the Enlightenment period that prioritize reason over religion. 
Bolstered by the two-pronged critique of history and theory, the Rational Religion of the middle 
and later Collegiant groups serves as an example of how the early Enlightenment remained 
religious in many respects. Whereas the critical theorists explored above critique the normative 
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ideal of reason in Enlightenment thinking, the cultural historical perspective developed below 
critiques the use of reason as a central characteristic of the Enlightenment period. 
 
The Second Reformation 
 According to Fix, the Collegiants "acted as a conduit by way of which many of the ideas 
of the sixteenth-century Radical Reformation entered the ideology of the Second Reformation of 
the seventeenth-century."
102
 As a hinge between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
Collegiants were also part of another smaller reform movement called the "Second Reformation 
of the seventeenth century." The moderates of the Second Reformation understood themselves 
"as carrying the work of the first Reformation to its logical conclusion by working within the 
established churches to purify and perfect them."
103
 Fix writes further that "[t]he Second 
Reformation groups accused the established churches of abandoning spiritual principles and 
compromising with the secular world on important matters of theology, morality, religious life, 
and political involvement."
104
 Representative of this Second Reformation, "[t]he Collegiant 
movement responded with disappointment to the perceived failure of the Reformation project, 
and identified a lack of authenticity and integrity in the churches that it produced."
105
 
 The reaction against the Reformation on the part of the Second Reformation had some of 
the same qualities of the broader Reformation that encompassed it.
106
 Much like the earlier 
Reformation, the Second Reformation was divided into a moderate wing and a radical wing. Fix 
writes that the moderate wing of the Second Reformation "was represented in the Netherlands by 
                                                 
102
 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 51. 
103
 Ibid., 49. 
104
 Ibid., 48-49. 
105
 Ibid., 50-51. 
106
 Some scholars of European history now argue for a "long European Reformation" that began 150 years 
before the common origin story of Luther nailing the ninety-five theses to the door at Wittenberg. See Peter G. 
Wallace, The Long European Reformation: Religion, Political Conflict, and the Search for Conformity, 1350-1750 
(London: Palgrave, 2004), 1. 
30 
 
a movement within the Dutch Reformed church that historians have called the Further 
Reformation (Nadere Reformatio)." 107 Fix writes of this particular collection of groups. 
The radical wing of the Second Reformation in Holland consisted in a group of reformers 
called by Kołakowski "nonconfessional Christians," referred to by Lindeboom as 
"Stiefkinderen van het Christendom" (step-children of Christianity), and called by C.B. 
Hylkema "Reformateurs." While the Nadere Reformatie worked for a renewal within the 
established Reformed church, the small sects and individual reformers who made up the 
radical Second Reformation wanted a total and immediate restoration of apostolic 
Christianity in all of its forms, even if this meant a rejection of all established 
churches.
108 
 
With an emphasis on purity, and a disappointment with previous attempts at the establishment of 
the true Church, the early Collegiants rejected confessional restraints, thereby joining the radical 
wing of the Second Reformation. 
 
The Radical Enlightenment 
 The connection that the Collegiants formed between the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment is strengthened by the work of historian Jonathan Israel, who locates the genesis 
of the greater "Moderate Enlightenment" of eighteenth-century France in the smaller "Radical 
Enlightenment" that began in the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century. Israel distinguishes 
between two streams in the movement of the Enlightenment, arguing that the smaller Radical 
Enlightenment greatly influenced the larger Moderate Enlightenment. Whereas the larger 
Moderate Enlightenment is more familiar to scholars of the Enlightenment, for Israel the smaller 
Dutch Radical Enlightenment was a much more important and influential force in determining 
the Enlightenment period as a whole. 
 According to Israel, the Moderate Enlightenment was upheld by state power and defined 
by the drive "to conquer ignorance and superstition, establish toleration, and revolutionize ideas, 
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education, and attitudes by means of philosophy but in such a way as to preserve and safeguard 
what were judged essential elements of the older structures, effecting a viable synthesis of old 
and new, and of reason and faith."
109
 The period of the Moderate Enlightenment was a "struggle 
for middle ground [that] remained inconclusive" from 1730 through 1750.
110
 As the Moderate 
Enlightenment sought to unify political power and Christian faith, the Radical Enlightenment 
eventually disrupted the struggle for middle ground and overtook the Moderate Enlightenment 
between 1780 and 1790, and influenced it from that point on.
111
 This radical stream of 
Enlightenment thinking begins early for Israel (well after the spread of Collegiant groups in the 
Dutch republic up to 1640).  
From its origins in the 1650s and 1660s, the philosophical radicalism of the European 
Early Enlightenment characteristically combined immense reverence for science, and for 
mathematical logic, with some form of non-providential deism, if not outright 
materialism and atheism along with unmistakably republican, even democratic 
tendencies.
112
 
 
Whereas the Moderate Enlightenment understood faith and reason to be compatible, the Radical 
Enlightenment was not inclined to negotiate and compromise on matters of faith and reason, and 
on the urgency of reform. Israel writes furthermore that 
the Radical Enlightenment, whether on an atheistic or deistic basis, rejected all 
compromise with the past and sought to sweep away existing structures entirely, rejecting 
the Creation as traditionally understood in Judaeo-Christian civilization, and the 
intervention of a providential God in human affairs, denying the possibility of miracles, 
and reward and punishment in an afterlife, scorning all forms of ecclesiastical 
authority.
113
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In his review of Israel's Radical Enlightenment, historian J.B. Shank summarizes Israel's position 
by identifying three major contributions that "constitute an important challenge to existing 
Enlightenment scholarship."
114
 First, Israel identifies Spinoza as a major, if unappreciated, 
influence upon the greater Moderate Enlightenment through the smaller Radical Enlightenment. 
Second, Israel moves the geographical centre of the Enlightenment from France to the Dutch 
Republic, the latter of which he identifies as the primary location of the Radical Enlightenment. 
Third, Israel moves the chronology of the Enlightenment resulting in a "reorientation toward the 
final third of the seventeenth century."
115
 On this third point, Israel himself writes that "there is 
an urgent need for Enlightenment historians to put much more emphasis on what was happening 
before and down to the 1740s."
116
 
 
The Critique of the Radical Enlightenment 
 Following his summary of Israel's three positive contributions, one major criticism that 
Shank identifies is a "frustrating traditionalism and maddening dismissal of an entire generation 
of newer Enlightenment scholarship."
117
 This critique is shared by historian Dorinda Outram, 
who writes about it explicitly at the end of her book The Enlightenment, and by historian Dena 
Goodman whose focus on the importance of feminist historiography is antithetical to Israel's 
method.
118
 In The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment Goodman 
writes of the method of cultural history, which greatly contrasts with Israel's approach. 
A cultural history of the French Enlightenment is not simply an intellectual history with a 
new name or even a broadening of intellectual history's field of inquiry from a small 
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canon of elite texts to a wider range of cultural materials. Unlike intellectual history, 
cultural history does not assume that ideas, or even those who articulate them, are the 
primary subject matter of historical inquiry. Rather, cultural history focuses on social and 
discursive practices and institutions: both the ground on which particular discursive 
actions take place and those actions themselves. Ideas are not of a different order from 
the practices and institutions that constitute them….
119
 
 
Goodman advocates for a cultural historical approach that takes into account the available range 
of cultural materials, rather than a history of ideas approach that focuses on intellectual trends 
and their proponents. The scholarship of Goodman and Outram could not be more different than 
Israel's methodology. In the words of Shank, Israel is "not generally inclined to treat texts and 
ideas in terms of their political, institutional, or gender context."
120
 Instead, Israel not only 
resurrects the older history of ideas approach characteristic of Peter Gay or Paul Hazard, but 
explicitly understands the values of the Enlightenment as normative.
121
  
 Given this study’s concern for the history of the Enlightenment and the specific place of 
the Collegiants in that history, Goodman's description reflects the practices and ideas found in 
the Collegiant group. One example of this connection in the Collegiant group is the reciprocal 
relationship between the idea of religious and social diversity and the practice of free prophecy. 
Another example is the reciprocal relationship between theological anticonfessionalism and the 
practice of baptism into the universal Christian Church. These two examples, which will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 3, show that the Collegiants lend themselves to study from 
the perspectives of both social history and the history of ideas because of their interlocking 
beliefs and practices. Understanding the history of Collegiant ideas and the leaders who 
purported them is as essential as understanding the history of Collegiant practices, such as how 
they conducted their meetings and how they developed their discursive norms. Because of this 
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dual need, the history of the Collegiants could greatly benefit from a critical appropriation of the 
perspectives of both Israel and Goodman. 
 Whereas Shank, Outram, and Goodman critique Israel from the standpoint of method, 
historian Douglas H. Shantz critiques Israel's reductive reading of the role of religion in the early 
Enlightenment. First of all, Shantz points out that Israel's treatment of religion is one of the most 
significant problems with his work, going so far as to say that Israel "does not take seriously the 
positive religious dimension of the Enlightenment, as a movement fundamentally inspired by and 
aligned with religion."
122
 Shantz opposes Israel's critique of the acceptance of religion by the 
moderate Enlightenment, instead affirming the significance of Dutch and German religious 
traditions in the development of the Enlightenment.
123
 Historians such as David Sorkin and 
Jennifer Powell McNutt share this critique of Israel's reductive treatment of the religious 
elements of the Enlightenment, arguing that religion was in fact an integral part of the 
Enlightenment movement.
124
 This recovery of the role of religion in the history of the 
Enlightenment joins with the critique of Enlightenment thinking provided at the beginning of this 
chapter, and thereby securing the importance of Collegiant Rational Religion.  
 
The Collegiants in the Radical Enlightenment 
 While the Collegiants are not usually included in the Enlightenment period proper, 
Israel's revision of the geography and chronology of the Enlightenment places the movement at 
the temporal and spatial origins of the Enlightenment. Writing years earlier than Israel, Fix states 
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that the "Collegiants and their thought formed a bridge between the providential Christian 
worldview of the Reformation era and the rational and secular outlook of the early 
Enlightenment."
125
 Because of where they are situated historically, the Collegiants help 
problematize long-held assumptions about what characterizes the Enlightenment period. They do 
this by showing the strength of religious influence in the Enlightenment period in general, given 
their influence in the Dutch Republic in the late seventeenth century. 
 The Collegiants also strongly challenge the way that Israel divides up the Radical and 
Moderate Enlightenments. Because the Radical Enlightenment begins in the Dutch Republic 
between 1650 and 1660 the Collegiants are indisputably placed within its bounds. The 
Collegiants belong to the time period and geographical location of the Radical Enlightenment, 
yet they challenge Israel's division between the Radical Enlightenment and the Moderate 
Enlightenment. Both the Radical Enlightenment and the Collegiants indeed rejected institutional 
structures and church authority; however, where Israel characterizes the Radical Enlightenment 
as being opposed to religion, Collegiant Rational Religion maintained the blended compatibility 
of Spiritualist and Rationalist influences in a way that extended beyond mere deism.
126
 Thus, the 
Collegiants remained a part of the time and place of the Radical Enlightenment while also 
challenging Israel's characterization of the Radical Enlightenment as an anti-religious trajectory. 
 In yet other ways, Collegiant values such as freedom of thought and toleration align with 
the values that Israel attributes to the greater Moderate Enlightenment. This correspondence 
between the Collegiant movement and the greater Moderate Enlightenment is present despite the 
fact that the sources of Collegiant values are not French but Dutch, and not from the eighteenth 
century but from the seventeenth century. Furthermore, the fact that the Collegiants maintained 
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the values of the Moderate Enlightenment concurrently with their religious convictions shows 
that the Enlightenment was not necessarily defined by the incommensurability of faith and 
reason in general, or Spiritualism and Rationalism in the particular case of the Collegiants. 
 Despite these significant incompatibilities, Israel explicitly identifies the Collegiant 
movement with the Radical Enlightenment. Emphasizing the heterodox nature of all Collegiants, 
Israel states that they were "disproportionately prominent in Dutch intellectual debate owing, 
above all, to the special emphasis they placed on the intellectual and spiritual freedom of the 
individual."
127
  Israel provides his own summary of the movement: 
The Collegiants might almost be described as an anti-Church, avowedly shedding all 
traditional accoutrements of ecclesiastical authority and power, as well as traditional 
notions of doctrinal orthodoxy. Joining the Collegiants, in contrast to other Churches, 
entailed no particular confessional allegiance or forms of outward observance or 
discipline, beyond a doctrinally vague, albeit usually fervent, commitment to Christian 
ideals. No one, whatever their views, was excluded from their midst, provided they 
accepted their manner of meeting and conducting their services... Their 'colleges' could 
rightly claim to surpass any other Christian community known in Europe in their ability 
to accommodate a wide spectrum of theological and philosophical opinion.
128
 
 
Israel's summary of the Collegiants accords with the characteristics that Fix and Kołakowski 
attribute to the group, namely the themes of anticonfessionalism, anticlericalism, and free-
speech. Directly following the summary quoted above, Israel describes a major Collegiant 
schism that occurred following the transition from their middle blended period to their late 
Rationalist period. 
Nevertheless, so fraught was the general intellectual atmosphere by the quarter of the 
century, and so acute their own internal crise de conscience, that finally it proved 
impossible any longer to sustain their traditional forbearance and unity in diversity. Such 
was the dissension gripping the movement, in the wake of the New Philosophy, that they 
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increasingly succumbed to bitter internecine strife and finally, in the 1680s, to the open 
schism which took many years to heal.
129
 
 
This summary of the Collegiant schism, known also as the Bredenburg dispute, implies that the 
contradictory forces of Spiritualism and Rationalism were too incompatible to maintain in 
tension, and were the eventual cause of the Collegiant schism. Discussed further in Chapter 3 
below, the Bredenburg dispute was a confrontation between the Collegiant Jan Bredenburg and 
his detractors that culminated in 1686 when the Collegiant movement began to splinter, 
beginning with the colleges in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and subsequently spreading outward. 
The splintering of the Collegiant group late in its history corresponded with both the rising 
influence of Rationalism and the corresponding view amongst the colleges that faith and reason 
were no longer compatible, but contradictory.  
 Here, two possible views of Collegiant Rational Religion emerge. On one hand, the 
blending of reason and faith developed in the first chapter above suggests that Spiritualist faith 
and the Rationalist reason were truly compatible during the Collegiant movement, therefore 
resulting in a stable equilibrium of Rational Religion. On the other hand, Israel implies that 
Collegiant Rational Religion did not involve real compatibility and accord, but rather an 
unsustainable underlying tension. If we accept Israel's argument that the Collegiants were 
destined for schism because of their internal crisis of conscience, then their flirtation with 
Rational Religion becomes merely a stepping stone towards an inevitable Rationalism. This 
teleological reading of reason as the determining factor of the Enlightenment movement misses 
the role of religion in the Enlightenment period that Shantz, Sorkin, and McNutt emphasize.  
 However, if we accept the blended paradigm, then the cause of the late Collegiant schism 
and ensuing Rationalism cannot be located in the attempt to hold together opposing viewpoints 
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because this holding-in-tension was a sustainable practice. Instead of locating the cause of the 
Collegiant schism in the tension between Spiritualism and Rationalism the following two 
chapters investigate the possibility that Collegiant Rational Religion became unsustainable under 
the strain of the logical rules of distinction associated with the Rationalist influence. 
 The teleological reading of the Collegiant trajectory, from Spiritualism through the 
middle blended period to Rationalism, does not hold up under Shantz's critique. Furthermore, the 
teleological interpretation of the Enlightenment as an unstoppable movement toward rationality 
does not hold up under historical or theoretical critiques outlined above. Strongly challenging the 
identification of Enlightenment with progress towards the end point of rationality, contemporary 
thinking about both the concept of Enlightenment and the period of the Enlightenment serve to 
further decouple the Enlightenment from the telos of pure reason and rationality. This decoupling 
is required in order to secure the importance of the blended middle period of the Collegiants, and 
to critique the reductive reading of the role of Rational Religion in the history of the Collegiants. 
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Chapter 3 
The Collegiant Transition to Rationalism 
 As the seventeenth century drew to a close, the defining features of Rational Religion lost 
their hold on the Collegiant group. As the Collegiants transitioned further and further toward a 
completely Rationalist perspective, they lost many of their defining characteristics, including 
their tolerant and accepting approach to disagreements and disputes. The loss of Rational 
Religion as a major influence on the Collegiant group due to the rise of Rationalism as an 
exclusive perspective, resulted in the disappearance of many key characteristics of Collegiant 
identity. 
 
Characterizing the Collegiant Group 
 The task of characterizing the Collegiant group is difficult because of their interior 
diversity and because of how the group changed over time. Rather than defining the Collegiants 
by focusing on one particular characteristic, it is preferable to draw upon several defining 
features in order to account for the inner diversity of the group. Furthermore, rather than defining 
the Collegiants by the linear and teleological movement from Spiritualism to Rationalism, the 
following defines the group by way of a constellation of intertwining ideas and practices that 
unfolded and changed over time. 
 Fix tends to define the Collegiants through the use of key themes like tolerance and 
freedom of thought and key practices like free prophecy and the open format of Collegiant 
gatherings. Similarly, but not identically, Kołakowski's most detailed description of the 
Collegiant movement is summarized in four thematic parts. 
The Collegiant movement embodies the highest social level of nonexclusive religious 
consciousness. The negative idea represented by the lack of belief in the existence of a 
40 
 
visible "true" church allows all of the distinguishing characteristics of the movement to 
be subordinated to this idea on the level of doctrine. These were (1) the absence of any 
clear limits to membership, allowing people from any denomination (even non-
Christians) to participate in religious observances, therefore allowing a person attending 
the Collegium to belong simultaneously to another congregation (this was highly unusual 
in the history of religious groups and meant renouncing any claim to the confessional 
"individuality" of one's own group); (2) complete equality of the faithful in religious life 
and the universal right to a voice (the "freedom of prophecy"); (3) the absence of  the 
institution of priest in any form; (4) the absence of any sacraments which would by 
themselves sanctify.
 130
 
 
Kołakowski first defines the Collegiants as exhibiting a "nonexclusive religious consciousness" 
in which there is no singular visible manifestation of God's 'true' church. This characterization is 
shared by H.W. Meihuizen who states that the Collegiants understood themselves as "a voluntary 
organization of 'interdenominational Christendom.'"
131
 Kołakowski's characterization of the 
Collegiants is then split into four parts: (1) open membership, allowing for people of any (or no) 
tradition to belong to the group, (2) freedom of speech, (3) anticlericalism, and (4) lack of 
sacramental sanctification. The four categories that I employ below differ slightly from 
Kołakowski's in an effort to also include the characteristics upheld by Fix.  
 1. The Collegiants were interiorly diverse in both belief and practice. There were many 
groups of Collegiants in the Dutch Republic (Amsterdam, Leiden, Rotterdam, etc.), and within 
those groups there were a wide variety of theological and social influences (Mennonites, 
Socinians, Remonstrants, etc.). 
 2. The Collegiants were anticonfessional in their belief that confessions were an 
unfaithful reduction and limitation of faith. Their practice of baptism into the universal Christian 
Church accordingly did not include a standardized confession with which to assure uniformity in 
group identity. 
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 3. The Collegiants were anticlerical in both their belief that apostolic succession was an 
imposture, and their rejection of hierarchical leadership. This theological belief was reflected in 
their practice of sharing their interpretations of scripture and experience from the floor of their 
meetings. 
 4. The Collegiants valued freedom of expression in the domain of belief, and freedom of 
speech in their corresponding practice of free prophecy. This is distinctive because the group did 
not merely include a wide variety of members with different viewpoints, but encouraged the 
freedom needed to maintain this interior diversity. 
 
1. Interior Diversity 
 The Collegiants were interiorly diverse in both belief and practice, and so scholarly 
efforts to define the group must struggle with the tension between the interior contradictions of 
the group and the exterior unity that the term "Collegiant" names. There were many groups of 
Collegiants in the Dutch Republic, including those in Amsterdam, Leiden, and Rotterdam. Each 
of these groups had their own leaders and their own interior social diversity. A defining feature 
of the Collegiant group was not only that many of their groups held different views and 
practices, but that this plurality was a part of their normative self-understanding of what the life 
of faith ought to be.  
 The interior diversity of people grouped under the name "Collegiant" exceeds any unified 
or homogenous singularization in a name, to the point where Kołakowski writes that "the 
boundaries of 'Collegiantism' cannot be determined precisely, because of the lack of clear criteria 
for membership and the absence of a homogeneous organization."
132
 He states further that "it is 
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impossible to cite any clear criteria which would make it possible to determine under any 
circumstances whether a given individual could be taken as a Collegiant or not."
133
  
 The interior diversity that Kołakowski emphasizes is constitutive of both the descriptive 
history of the Collegiants and their normative vision. On one hand, the group remains diverse 
because of its constitutive diversity, but on the other hand the group is unified because of the 
common affirmation of this diversity. Even within each specific college there were many 
different religious influences, including Mennonites, Socinians, and Remonstrants. Each of these 
groups had their own confessional and ecclesial traditions, yet they gathered under the Collegiant 
name. 
 The conditions that permitted Collegiant interior diversity were national, economic, and 
religious. Kołakowski writes that "Dutch public life in the seventeenth century was distinguished 
by its immense sensitivity on the question of religious tolerance, understood here as the 
voluntary acceptance of the existence and spread of opinions which one does not share."
134
 
Furthermore, Kołakowski claims that "the Collegiants' belief constitutes the most highly 
developed manifestation of this sensitivity."
135
 The cultural and political atmosphere of tolerance 
within the Collegiant group was further encouraged by the diversity of the Dutch Republic, 
which owed much of its own existence to the diverse populations attracted to it by its strong 
trade economy.
136
 
 To take a broader historical perspective, because of Israel's revision of the geography and 
timeline of the Enlightenment, it is now evident that the Collegiants were situated at the 
beginning of an important civic development: the public sphere. In his book The Structural 
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Transformation of the Public Sphere, social theorist Jürgen Habermas examines the expansive 
change in civic sociability that occurred in the creation and transformation of the public sphere in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
137
 Habermas understands the public sphere to be present 
when "the sphere of private people come together as a public."
138
 This public sphere was born 
out of a "political confrontation" between the group of private individuals that composed the 
public sphere, and the public authorities who regulated civil life.
139
 For Habermas the "rational-
critical debate" permitted by the beginnings of the bourgeois public sphere challenged the 
narrative of domination that had existed in feudal societies, thereby beginning the "process of the 
polarization of state and society."
140
 This polarization is an essential precursor to Kant's 
distinction between the public and private use of reason, and so for Habermas "[t]he line between 
state and society, fundamental in our context, divided the public sphere from the private 
realm."
141
 
 The term "civic sociability" is often used to describe this open atmosphere of debate and 
critical exchange that characterized the public sphere. Habermas associates this civic sociability 
with the French salon culture that he characterizes in three major ways: (1) the disregarding of 
status, and the inclusion of all people in social discourse, (2) the conversion of culture into a 
commodity, and (3) the inclusive principle that allowed culture to become "an object of 
discussion" in its own right.
142
 In addition to the French salon culture, these principles accord 
with the major characteristics of the Collegiant movement. The Enlightenment public sphere 
linked together the formerly private realm of opinion with the newfound sites of civic 
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sociability.
143
 These sites included salons, coffee shops, learned societies, book clubs, and 
Masonic lodges.
144
 While France is traditionally referred to as the central example of this type of 
civic sociability, the Dutch Republic is also a central point of reference for the beginnings of 
public discourse.
145
 
Predating in the French bloom in civic sociability, the Collegiants were (1) oriented 
toward the inclusion of diverse people groups, (2) enmeshed in the Dutch trade in cultural goods 
such as books and tulips, and (3) the Collegiants understood their discussions to be a cultural 
activity with its own social dignity and civic importance. 
 While Habermas identifies both Great Britain and France as important locations of civic 
sociability in the early days of the public sphere, he does mention the importance of the Dutch 
Republic as a significant site of trade and commerce. He writes that "[w]ith the emergence of 
early finance and trade capitalism, the elements of a new social order were taking shape," and 
this formative process involved "the rise first of Dutch centers for staple goods (Bruges, Lüttich, 
Brussels, Ghent, etc.) and then of the great trade fairs at the crossroads of long-distance trade."
146
 
Habermas makes this connection between the advance in trade and commerce in the Dutch 
Republic and the beginnings of the public sphere, and emphasizes the development of print 
culture, and the consequent emergence of a literate public. He writes that during that time "one 
spoke of the 'world of readers' (Lesewelt), or simply of the world (Welt) in the sense still used 
today: all the world, tout le monde."147 
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 Andrew Fix writes that apart from their "regular meetings, however, the Collegiants often 
held separate and less formal gatherings for discussion of a wide variety of religious, moral, and 
philosophical topics. At these meetings the most controversial topics of the day were 
addressed."
148
 In addition to discussing controversial topics, Fix writes, "Collegiant toleration 
allowed for a wide variety of opinions on the minutiae of doctrine, which the Collegiants 
regarded as the adiaphora of religion. Despite such differences of detail, however, the 
Rijnsburgers [early Collegiants] never lost their sense of being members of a unified and 
distinctive brotherhood of kindred spirits."
 149
 The idea that some matters were adiaphora ‒ 
things that God neither requires nor forbids ‒ aligns with Kołakowski's attribution of 
nonexclusive religious consciousness to the Collegiant group. This idea that some theological 
questions did not require answers challenges later Collegiant Rationalism because it suggests that 
there is no need to choose between spiritual and rational perspectives. As the Collegiants became 
more influenced by Rationalism, the blending of perspectives permitted by the idea of adiaphora 
was replaced by a perspective that valued answers more than questions. 
 The interior diversity of the Collegiant group is evident in two further ways. First, Fix 
writes that the Collegiants did not create grand systems, but instead kept "written record of 
intellectual transition itself; the struggles, the give and take, the contradictions, the difficult 
process of disillusionment and adjustment that marked the intellectual journey of a group of 
intensely serious and deeply pious thinkers toward a new concept of religious truth."
150
 This 
seriousness, not mobilized toward the creation of all-encompassing and totalizing systems, is an 
important characteristic of the Collegiant group. For the Collegiants, the stakes were high, and 
the issue of religious truth and moral action were paramount, and yet they rejected grand 
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explanatory frameworks and binding confessions in favor of dialogue and discussion. The 
maintenance of diversity within a context in which the stakes were so high is significant and 
deserves consideration in contemporary debate. 
 Second, the Collegiants were discussion-oriented intellectuals who belonged to neither 
the lower nor upper class. They were, in the words of Fix, "educated and well-read professional 
people who maintained a serious interest in intellectual and religious developments as well as an 
intense religious piety and moral seriousness."
151
 The somewhat wealthy existence of most 
Collegiants also ensured the sort of disposable income necessary for the purchase of books and 
tracts, as well as the kind of literacy needed to read them.
152
 This sociability reflects the mixed 
social makeup of the more familiar coffee shops, masonic lodges, and libraries of the eighteenth-
century Enlightenment. 
 
2. Anticonfessionalism 
 The Collegiants were anticonfessional in their belief that written confessions were a 
dangerous reduction of Christian convictions. Kołakowski defines the Collegiants as an example 
of "nondenominational Christianity" who 
 
saw discussion and tolerance as virtues, and 
understood sectarianism and dispute as kinds of unfaithfulness.
153
 Their anticonfessional nature 
encouraged a plurality of beliefs and rejected the restrictiveness of confessions. For the 
Collegiants, Kołakowski writes "Satan supports the multiplication of confessions."
154
 Fix 
corroborates this thesis, stating that "the central characteristic of the Collegiant movement was 
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its opposition to ecclesiastical authority and its desire for individual liberty and equality in 
religious life."
155
 
 The Collegiant practice of baptism into the universal Christian Church was the practical 
extension of the theological rejection of confessions. Collegiants baptized their members into the 
universal church, rather than into a particular congregation, and they allowed those being 
baptized to develop their own personal confessions rather than asking them to conform to a 
standard confession.
156
 Kołakowski writes,  
The religious community proclaims itself a secular institution, called to strengthen 
collectively  its religious values, but deprived of any charismatic glory of a religious 
group in its ideas, activities and rituals. Even baptism by immersion — introduced in 
order to emphasize the group's feeling of being related to apostolic times — not only had 
a purely symbolic value, with no sanctifying  function, but did not even serve as an act by 
which one joined a Collegiant community. Baptism was also not a condition of being 
involved in congregations; persons who underwent baptism were witnessing by this that 
they were ready, on their own responsibility, to become part of  Christianity "in general" 
— the loose gathering of Collegiants did not want to equate themselves with being 
Christian. The community thus had no general act which would put the seal on entrance 
into its ranks.  It lived in the form of loose association, having a fluid framework.
 157
 
 
The Collegiants understood themselves as a secular organization because of the absence of the 
"charismatic glory" that constituted the true church. In general the Collegiants did not understand 
sacraments to be important, and it appears that they did not understand the supper or baptism to 
have any metaphysical consequences when they were practiced. Baptism then, was a way to 
witness to one's own personal faith, rather than a condition or expectation for membership.  
 On the topic of membership, the Collegiant leader Galenus believed that baptism was "a 
publicly given proof of the acceptance of Christianity, [in which] one joins the general Christian 
Church and not any particular congregation."
158
 This practice of baptizing members into the 
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general Christian church rather than an individual congregation was common to the Collegiants 
and was also practiced occasionally by the anticonfessional Doopsgezinden.
159
 
 
3. Anticlericalism 
 The Collegiants rejected the priesthood and hierarchical leadership, although these two 
rejections were not necessarily identical. Although all Collegiants rejected priests and the 
apostolic authority that came with them, the Collegiants did have their own kind of minimal 
hierarchical leadership evident in the fact that their leaders (Galenus Abrahamsz, Pieter Balling, 
etc.) were influential personalities who led the colleges in making decisions. 
 The Collegiants were anticlerical in their belief that apostolic succession was not granted 
to clerics. Kołakowski describes that, for the Collegiants, "Priests were called idlers who wanted 
to pursue an idle life at the cost of the congregation."
160
 This anticlerical attitude shows the 
significant sixteenth-century Anabaptist and Spiritualist influences on the Collegiant group. Like 
the Anabaptists, the Collegiants rejected the power of the clergy, and "[i]n place of the 
established congregations they proposed a Christianity without formal church structures, a 
universal Christianity above doctrinal divisions and a regeneration of religious life through 
individual piety and moral purity."
161
 
 Both Kołakowski and historian J.C. van Slee characterize the Collegiant group as 
anticlerical and focused on freedom of speech. Although both Kołakowski and van Slee are 
hesitant to reduce one characteristic to the other, it is evident that Kołakowski favors 
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anticlericalism as the primary characteristic of the Collegiant movement, and van Slee favors 
freedom of expression as the primary characteristic of the Collegiant movement. In his summary 
of their differing approaches, Kołakowski notes van Slee's rejection of anticlericalism as the 
defining feature of Collegiant thought and practice, and describes how van Slee sees 
anticlericalism as a means to the end of freedom of expression. Although Kołakowski admits that 
the two defining factors have "exactly the same meaning," and that the difference between the 
two is reducible to a "matter of semantics," he does continue to favor the adjective "anticlerical" 
when describing the Collegiant group.
162
 While Kołakowski is likely inclined to see the group as 
defined by their anticlerical orientation because of his personal anti-authoritarian political 
convictions, van Slee is likely opposed to defining the Collegiants based solely on anticlericalism 
because of his Mennonite background and confessional historiography. It is likely that freedom 
of expression and anticlericalism were both significantly definitive of the Collegiant movement, 
and it is possible to see the two as complementary descriptors rather than competitive 
descriptors, especially given that anticlericalism is a negative characteristic and freedom of 
speech is its inverse positive characteristic. 
 
4. Free Prophecy 
 The Collegiants valued both freedom of expression in the domain of belief, and freedom 
of speech in their corresponding practice of free prophecy. The idea that one should be free to 
express dissenting views corresponded with the practice of free prophecy in Collegiant meetings. 
Fix writes that "[n]othing was more fundamental to both the theory and the practice of Collegiant 
religious life than free prophecy."
163 
Kołakowski writes that with the Collegiants "a new type of 
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congregation came into being, one whose essential quality was based originally on absolute 
freedom of speech in religious matters."
164
 This principle of freedom of speech was a central 
tenet of the faith held by the early Collegiants, and a central point of reference for their later 
Rationalism. Fix writes further that "[n]o one was censured for their beliefs in college meetings," 
indicating the central role of free speech in both the formal times of reflection and the informal 
discussions associated with the Collegiant meetings.
165
 The ritual associated with these general 
convictions about freedom and dialogue was that the Collegiant groups "met two or three times a 
week in a church or a private home, where the members prayed, sang hymns, read, and discussed 
Scripture and debated religious reform."
166
 Within these meetings, if a person felt convicted to 
speak, they would freely share an interpretation of a scripture text or an experience.
167
 According 
to Fix. 
College meetings were held once a month on a Sunday. They began with a prayer, 
followed by the reading of a scriptural text and the interpretation of the text by free 
prophecy. Meetings closed with a final song and a prayer. This remained the basic pattern 
for all Collegiant meetings in Warmond and Rijnsburg as well as in the many other 
colleges that soon arose throughout the United Provinces. Most college meetings featured 
a succession of four, five, or more lengthy prophecies that often caused meetings to last 
meetings to last far into the night.
 168
 
 
To avoid any suggestion of clerical authority, no podium was used. Each speaker 
addressed the meeting from his seat among the congregation. The meetings usually 
closed with prayer and a song.
 169
 
 
In these contexts, freedom of expression was highly valued, which accorded with the anticlerical 
disdain for apostolic or ordained leadership. Fix writes that "[t]he Collegiants insisted upon 
conducting their meetings in such a way that allowed everyone to have an equal voice, and 
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ensured that no one person would exert special authority upon the group."
170
 This negative and 
critical posture toward authority was then manifest in the positive practice of sharing their 
ruminations on scripture, prophecy, and experience. The practice of free prophecy began as an 
extension of the early Collegiant belief that "by meeting without a preacher and by giving each 
member the freedom to speak during the service, the college was conforming more closely to 
apostolic Christian practices than did the services of the established churches."
171
 The attitude 
was such that the group was expressing their anticlerical and anticonfessional beliefs through the 
practice of free prophecy, and doing so because they understood it to be faithful, rather than an 
expression of enlightened freedom. 
 
The Spinoza Circle: Pieter Balling and Jarig Jelles 
 A pronounced movement toward Rationalism characterized the later days of the 
Collegiant group, and unlike the period of Rational Religion, this kind of Rationalism was not 
compatible with, or even tolerant of, the fading Spiritualist influence. The initial stages of this 
movement toward Rationalism are evident in the work of Pieter Balling (d. 1669?) and Jarig 
Jelles (1620-1683). Balling and Jelles were part of the so-called "Spinoza Circle," a group of 
thinkers who gathered around the person and work of Baruch Spinoza. Kołakowski is quick to 
deny any strong connection between Balling and Jelles and the Collegiants, and he also claims 
that the two were not all that close with Spinoza. Fix, on the other hand, considers them to be 
important and influential Rijnsburgers,
172
 and the much more recent work of historian Wiep van 
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Bunge supports the idea that Jelles and Balling were influential in Collegiant circles, and can 
therefore rightly be called Collegiants.
173
  
 Pieter Balling was an educated merchant who could speak several languages including 
Spanish, Latin, and Greek. Apart from having translated some of Spinoza's work into Dutch, 
little else is known about his biography.
174
 Fix writes that Balling was 
a member of the Amsterdam college and of the United Mennonite congregation and close 
friend of both Galenus and Spinoza, [who] wrote two substantial works during 1663 to 
1664 in defense of Galenus's ideas. In these works Balling took a purely secular and 
uncharismatic view of the Mennonite church. In his opinion, any religious association in 
the corrupt world of his day could be nothing more than a gathering of like-minded 
people freely confessing their similar beliefs.
 175
 
 
Fix states that Balling took a "purely secular and uncharismatic view" of the church, calling to 
mind the definition of Enlightenment as disenchantment and demythologization. At the same 
time, however, Balling was given to Spiritualist references to the "inner light," affirming a 
"mystical, nondiscursive contact with God, who dwells in every person in the form of an inner 
light."
176
 Balling's theology is complex and cannot be reduced to names like "Spiritualism" or 
"Rationalism." Instead, for Balling, God remains a mystery that can be met in experience, but not 
contained in language. Kołakowski writes that, for Balling, "knowledge of God precedes 
knowledge of created things."
177
 This knowledge of God is found in experience rather than 
study, and yet his work "contained unmistakable rationalist elements," according to Fix.
178
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 Balling's major work, The Light upon the Candlestick, refers to the "Light of Truth, the 
true Light which enlighten every man that cometh into the world."
179
 This Light "is a clear and 
distinct knowledge of truth in the understanding of every man, by which he is so convinced of 
the Being and Quality of things, that he cannot possibly doubt thereof."
180
 This short treatise on 
the inner light uses Spiritualist language while also describing the Light of Truth using terms that 
appear to be inherited from Spinoza's metaphysics ("Being and Quality"), thereby associating 
Balling with the Rational Religion of the Collegiant group. According to historian Ruben Buys, 
Balling's short treatise was strongly influenced by the much earlier combination of Spiritualism 
and Rationalism found in the work of sixteenth century Dutch author Dirck Volckertsz 
Coornhert. Buys writes that "Coornhert, writing in the second half of the sixteenth century, is, 
ironically enough, far more explicit in this exact equation [of the inner Light with Reason] than 
Balling."
181
 By deepening the connection between Balling and Coornhert, Buys' article shows in 
detail how the combination of Rationalist and Spiritualist influences run much deeper in the 
Collegiant movement than Fix or Kołakowski describe in their work. 
 More is known about Jarig Jelles than Pieter Balling. Jelles worked as a grocer in 
Amsterdam and later left his store to study metaphysics and religion.
182
 Whereas Spinoza’s 
influence is more subtle in Balling's The Light Upon the Candlestick, its influence on Jelles' 
work is pronounced, especially in Jelles' 1684 Confession of the General and Christian Faith 
(Belydenisse des algemeenen en christlyken geloofs). Reflecting his Rationalist leanings, for 
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Jelles, "Sin is the result of ignorance, and liberation from sin is the result of knowledge."
183
 
According to Kołakowski, "if Jelles asserts the 'rational' character of communication with God 
with such force, his acquaintance with Spinoza bears the responsibility," and he refers to Jelles' 
Confession of the General and Christian Faith stating that "the formulas which speak of the 
divine wisdom that was revealed most abundantly in Jesus were taken almost entirely from the 
Theological-Political Tractate [of Spinoza]."184 Kołakowski continues, describing how Jelles 
"wrote his texts in some sense translating metaphysical terminology into a language that morally 
pure people and the intellectually weak could associate with traditional religious images."
185
  
 This blending of Spiritualist concerns and Rationalist language serves as evidence that 
both Balling and Jelles belong to Collegiant Rational Religion. Furthermore, both Balling and 
Jelles support the thesis that the blending of Spiritualist and Rationalist influences was a 
sustainable compatibility rather than a brooding discontinuity that would eventually result in the 
victory of one side or the other. 
 
The Collegiants and the Mennonites  
 Another group that influenced the Collegiants and exhibited the combination of 
Spiritualist and Rationalist influences was the Mennonites. Fix writes that "Anabaptist 
Mennonites were the first group to be attracted in large numbers to the colleges,"
186
 and he 
extends his treatment of the relationship between the two overlapping groups in an essay called 
"Mennonites and Collegiants in Holland 1630-1700."
187
 Mennonites were attracted to the 
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Collegiant meetings and represented a large part of the movement’s membership throughout the 
Dutch Republic.
188
 Galenus remains a major connecting point between the Collegiants and the 
Mennonites, alongside other preachers like Pieter Langedult in Haarlem and Laurens Klinkhamer 
in Leiden. Fix explains that, under the influence of Galenus, "many other Mennonites joined the 
college, and Collegiant ideas entered the United Mennonite congregation."
189
 Presenting his 
evaluation of the War of the Lambs, Fix writes that "Collegiant ideas led to damaging divisions 
within the congregation and eventually caused a schism that ripped apart the entire Dutch 
Mennonite church."
190
  
 This schism was rooted in a divide between conservative and liberal perspectives within 
the United Mennonite congregation and was exacerbated by the anticonfessional openness of 
Collegiant thought. The War of the Lambs was motivated in part by a Collegiant request to use 
the Mennonite chapel for Collegiant meetings. Galenus' support of this action led to a deep 
polarization that unleashed "a flood of pent-up hostility on the part of Galenus's critics, who 
accused him of trying to smuggle heretical ideas into the congregation."
191
 The Mennonite 
concern for keeping heretical ideas out of the congregation conflicted with the Collegiant 
openness to divergent perspectives, and this made reconciliation very difficult, if not impossible.  
Despite this tension, Galenus remained sensitive to both his Lamist home and his Zonist 
opponents throughout his life.
192
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 Fix's assessment of the Collegiant influence on the Mennonites is that "it is difficult not 
to conclude that the influence was primarily harmful."
193
 This assessment is problematic because 
it understands the tensions and disagreements that Collegiant ideas caused as harmful, betraying 
a negative disposition towards conflict. In a similar way, historian Samme Zijlstra holds up the 
Collegiants as an example of how extreme tolerance and anticonfessionalism can lead to 
"anarchy" and the loss of group cohesion.
194
 
 Instead of negatively evaluating the anarchic influence of the Collegiants on the 
Mennonites, the present study finds that Collegiant ideas were a generative irritant on the skin of 
the Mennonite churches, causing them to re-evaluate the tenets of their faith. Whereas Fix 
assesses the influence of the Collegiants on the Mennonites as damaging, he understands 
influence in the opposite direction in much more positive terms. Fix states definitively that "[t]he 
Mennonite influence on the Collegiant movement was substantial and important," adding that 
"Mennonite ideas concerning pacifism, baptism, government service and practical piety were 
very influential within the Collegiant movement."
195
  The history of the Collegiants is 
inextricably intertwined with the history of the Mennonites in the Dutch Republic. Although 
most Mennonites were not themselves Collegiants, the reciprocal influence between the two 
groups was significant.  
 The influence of both Collegiants and Mennonites on the rising Enlightenment culture in 
the Dutch Republic was also significant. In a 2009 essay, Piet Visser writes of the "prominent 
roles that were played by a great number of Doopsgezinden during the era of the Dutch 
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Enlightenment."
196
 Historian Michael Driedger's essay, "An Article Missing from the Mennonite 
Encyclopedia: ‘The Enlightenment in the Netherlands’" speaks to the renewed interest that the 
study of Dutch Mennonites has found in recent English scholarship.
197
 In his chapter Driedger 
proposes that scholars change their priorities in the discourse on Mennonites and the 
Enlightenment. He states that "A useful paradigm shift could begin by asking, not how 
Mennonites were affected by the Enlightenment and the revolutionary era, but rather how they 
contributed to them."
198
 Historian Ernst P. Hamm explores one answer to this question in his 
work on Mennonite participation in "many aspects of the commercial, cultural, and intellectual 
life of the Republic, and in doing so participated in the broader changes sweeping across early 
modern Europe."
199
 Hamm continues, "Mennonites of whatever stripe were all 'in the world' 
even if some felt more strongly than others that they need not be 'of the world.'"200 The realities 
of enculturation and assimilation, criticized in the older historiography, are now a source of rich 
scholarly investigation by confessional and nonconfessional historians alike. Hamm concludes, 
in this vein, stating that "there is no reason to doubt that they [Mennonites] believed new 
knowledge could and should be employed to change the world for the better"
201
 Examples of this 
involvement in the scientific, political, and cultural advances in the seventeenth century Dutch 
Republic include the study of natural knowledge at the Amsterdam seminary (including subjects 
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from astronomy to physics), the deep involvement of Mennonite gardeners in the tulip trade, and 
the book trade in cities from Amsterdam to Groningen.
202
 
 The Collegiant involvement with both the Spinoza Circle and the Mennonites shows how 
the Collegiants were involved with diverse intellectual and social groups. The public nature of 
Collegiant discourse, spanning religious and secular spheres, allowed the group to sympathize 
with Balling and Jelles' reading of Spinoza in tandem with the doctrine of the inner light, and the 
religious contribution to the Enlightenment made by the Mennonites who pioneered advances in 
publishing, charity, natural sciences, and pedagogy. Visser writes that the "intelligentsia of the 
Dutch dissident churches, dominated by the Remonstrants and the Doopsgezinden, were crucial 
for the introduction, accommodation and acceptance of enlightened ideas and cultural and social 
changes."
203
 This social commitment to public life, characteristic of the Dutch dissident churches 
that the Collegiants were connected with, "aimed at the cultural, intellectual and especially the 
moral improvement of the nation."
204
 
 
Collegiant Rationalism: Jan Bredenburg and Daniel Zwicker  
 Whereas the overlap between Collegiants and Mennonites demonstrates an appreciation 
for the world alongside the desire to change it, the world-affirmation of this Rational Religious 
perspective was eclipsed by the Rationalism that dominated the final years of the Collegiant 
group. This Rationalism is represented in partial form by the thought of Jan Bredenburg, and, in 
fuller form, the thought of Daniel Zwicker. Bredenburg wrote that "[r]eason and belief are both 
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realms of truth, each in its own way."
205
 Fix argues that Bredenburg's exemplary statement on the 
compatibility of reason and belief, and, by extension, the influences of Spiritualism and 
Rationalism, represents the fulfillment of Collegiant Religious Rationalism. Bredenburg's 
position was unique because he saw reason as an independent source of truths that existed 
"alongside the truths of divine revelation."
206
 Rather than seeing reason and belief as 
irreconcilable, or seeing reason and belief as really the same thing, he understood the two 
epistemic measures as distinct but complementary. Despite reason and revelation being 
"contradictory," Fix writes that Bredenburg understood each to be "independent, valid, and 
autonomous sources of religious truth."
207
 
 Fix divides Bredenburg's thought into two phases: an early Spinozist phase characterized 
by a "rationalist approach to religious knowledge,"
208
 and a later phase in which he responded to 
critics by stating that the rational and nonrational could co-exist despite being contradictory.
209
 
Under this model, reason "yield[s] to a higher order of knowledge," meaning that "a person 
might believe something to be true based on revelation while at the same time he rationally 
understood it to be false."
210
 Some Collegiants were concerned that Bredenburg's "failure to 
reconcile the truths of reason with those of revelation would inevitably lead to the rejection of 
revealed truth, and for this reason they declared war on the idea of reason as a source of religious 
truth."
211
 Bredenburg's opponents within the Collegiant group then tried to force him to choose 
between reason and belief as sources of truth.
212
 This resulted in the "Bredenburg Controversy," 
which began as a debate between Bredenburg and the Collegiant Frans Kuyper, and then spread 
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and affected the whole Collegiant movement.
213
 Kuyper charged Bredenburg with being a 
Spinozist and accused him of denying the existence of God. The additional accusation of atheism 
"deeply offended Bredenburg, who considered himself a pious Christian."
214
 Following the 
discussions in Rijnsburg in 1672, the debate continued, and came to a head in 1685 when "the 
regents of the Orangje-Appel, the orphanage in which the college held its meetings, barred both 
supporters and opponents of Bredenburg from the building."
215
 The next year, the Bredenburgers 
and their opponents found other accommodations, and the Amsterdam college "thus experienced 
the first and only schism in its history.”
216
 Although this dispute took place in 1686, it would 
take another 100 years for the Collegiant movement to disappear.
217
  
 Fix offers the following summary of the Bredenburg dispute:  
The thought of Jan Bredenburg represented the climax of Collegiant rationalism and the 
culmination of a long intellectual odyssey that took the Rijnsburgers from spiritualism 
and millenarianism through stages of rational religion and rational spiritualism before 
arriving at a largely secular philosophical rationalism.
218
  
 
This suggests that the Collegiants dissolved because they could not take the final step beyond 
their ideological confinement, and that they were merely "transitional" figures on the way to 
Spinoza's Rationalist Enlightenment.
219
 Fix writes that "[t]he final step to a completely secular 
rationalism was a step that neither Bredenburg nor the other Collegiants could take" and that the 
biblical tradition of the Rijnsburgers "formed a limit beyond which most Collegiant thinkers 
could not venture."
220
 Fix emphasizes that the Collegiants "were unable to abandon completely 
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the old for the new" and that although they "set the stage for the final breakthrough into a new 
worldview" they "could not make this breakthrough themselves."
221
  
 Instead of collapsing into Rationalism under the weight of the contradictory influences of 
Spiritualism and Rationalism during the blended period, a strong explanation for the Collegiant 
movement to full Rationalism is present in a small detail of the Bredenburg dispute. As 
Bredenburg's simultaneous affirmation of faith and reason became too dissonant for his 
opponents they "called on him to choose between the two rival sources of truth."
222
 This 
represents a significant movement away from compatibility and blending, toward a perspective 
that eventually saw Spiritualist faith and Rationalist reason as incompatible and contradictory. 
Whereas Bredenburg's opponents exemplify an early form of this perspective, another Collegiant 
thinker demonstrates this tendency more explicitly. 
 Daniel Zwicker (1612-1678) was a doctor from Danzig who associated with the 
Socinians and the Polish Brethren and disputed with the Collegiants after moving to Amsterdam 
in 1657.
223
 In addition to participating in Collegiant gatherings, Zwicker also gathered a small 
group of followers around himself.
224
 Kołakowski writes that Zwicker "experienced the 
'rationalist' pressure to an even greater extent than did those described earlier, as evidenced by 
the fact that he actually attempted to apply the general slogan [of rationalism] to his own 
arguments."
225
 Zwicker understood human reason to be "the most effective tool for achieving the 
changes needed in religious life," including the tasks of scriptural interpretation and the 
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restoration of the "true doctrine" of the church.
226
 Most importantly, in his work on Christ's two 
natures, Zwicker proposed that "Christ could not have had both a human nature and a divine 
nature… because nobody could have two different natures at one and the same time."
227
 The 
proof that Zwicker offered for this Rationalist and anti-mystical interpretation was found in a 
principle that he named "the rule of distinction."
228
 This principle held that "It is impossible to 
predicate two contrary things of one subject at the same time."
229
 Instead of taking a mystical 
approach, Zwicker employed logical argumentation, maintaining that "any doctrine that 
contradicted reason was 'impossible and false'", and furthermore that "without reason, heresy 
would overwhelm the church."
 230
 
 Zwicker's rule of distinction is exactly the sort of influence that led to the Collegiant 
rejection of the compatibility of contradictory perspectives, and his thought is a marker of the 
Collegiant transition from comfort with adiaphora to increasing polarization. The logical 
perspective promoted by Zwicker's rule of distinction represent a kind of thinking that 
understands opposing viewpoints as incommensurable contradictions, and contradictions as 
unsustainable. This Rationalist approach also contributed greatly to the dispute between 
Bredenburg and Kuyper, which eventually contributed to the Collegiant schism, and the decline 
of the major Collegiant characteristic of tolerant free discussion. 
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Chapter 4 
Rethinking the Secular with the Dutch Collegiants 
With the secular as the concept in question, and the early Enlightenment as the cultural 
and historical context, this study has explored the thought and practices of the Collegiants in 
order to uncover historical resources for the task of rethinking the origins and history of the 
contemporary concept of the secular. The majority of this study has presented the ways in which 
the Collegiants exhibited both religious and secular characteristics, while also exceeding the 
boundaries of the contemporary categories of religion and the secular. Insofar as particular 
Collegiants such as Galenus Abrahamsz and Pieter Balling were representative of the group, the 
Collegiants remained both secular and religious at the same time, thereby challenging not only 
the division between sacred and secular, but also challenging the concept of the secular itself. By 
articulating how the Collegiants challenge the concept of the secular and complicate the 
distinction between religion and the secular, this chapter endeavors to rethink the secular by 
focusing on the coexistence of Spiritualist and Rationalist influences within the Collegiant group, 
understanding that historical Spiritualism and Rationalism do not directly map onto 
contemporary concepts of faith and reason, or religion and the secular.  
 Contemporary cultural studies, philosophy, and theology each contest and debate the 
category of the secular.
231
 These scholarly discourses on the secular, and in particular the 
"postsecular" position, reject the popular assumption that the secular is a straightforward and 
unbiased concept. Following from this rejection, many contemporary critiques of the secular 
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respond to the widespread identification of secularization with modernization by endeavoring to 
rethink the genealogy of the secular as a concept. 
 Contrary to the contemporary assumption that the secular provides a value-neutral and 
ahistorical basis for culture and politics,232 the Collegiants historically demonstrate that the 
boundary line between religion and the secular is more permeable than stable. While the 
contemporary concept of the secular quietly asserts itself as the default metaphysical position, a 
non-teleological reading of Collegiant Rational Religion leads to the conclusion that there is 
nothing inevitable about the enlightened victory of the secular over religion. Instead of being an 
unconditioned and unbiased concept, the Collegiants show that the secular is a concept that 
restricts thinking by imposing artificial limits. Furthermore, while the contemporary concept of 
the secular claims to have always underpinned good public discourse,
233
 the Collegiants 
demonstrate that a public sphere can thrive in a context that is simultaneously religious and 
secular. It follows that because the Collegiants represent a culturally rich discourse that is both 
religious and secular, the secular cannot serve as the sole measure of good discourse.  
 Collegiant Rational Religion serves to critique secular claims to both ahistoricity and 
value-neutrality. First, the Collegiants demonstrate that the secular is not value-neutral by 
showing that the use of reason (a primary vehicle of secular sensibility) can be oriented toward 
both religious and non-religious ends. Collegiant Rational Religion used reason to both interpret 
spiritual experience (therefore shoring up what we would call the religious perspective) and to 
disenchant the biblical text (lending support to what we now call the secular perspective). This 
two-sided orientation of reason in Collegiant Rational Religion period allowed them to blend 
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together Spiritualism and Rationalism, thereby making complementary what often appears to be 
contradictory. This combination and blending calls into question the contemporary divide 
between the secular and religion in two significant ways. On one hand, the two-sided orientation 
of reason shows the contemporary reader that reason, and therefore the secular, is not a value-
neutral term that expresses a singular truth. Instead, reason and the secular are oriented toward 
particular political ends, and each term can be used to serve the interests of those with discursive 
power. On the other hand, the two-sided orientation of reason allowed for the blending of 
Spiritualism and Rationalism in Collegiant Rational Religion, thereby demonstrating that reason 
can be positively mobilized toward dialogical and discursive ends.  
 This leads to the second complication: the Collegiant story historicizes the link between 
reason and the secular. While many philosophers and theologians understand reason to be 
aligned with the secular, for better or for worse, Collegiant Rational Religion understood reason 
to accord with the Christian religion. The rationality of the Christian religion and the rationality 
of the natural sciences did not conflict in Collegiant Rational Religion because the Collegiants 
did not think of reason as a monolithic singularity. In Collegiant Rational Religion, rationality 
was a faculty employed in the service of both religion and the natural sciences, whereas the 
dominant attitudes of late modernity understood reason as a singular perspective intolerant of 
religion. This profound reversal of the alignment of reason from the early Enlightenment to the 
present should cause us to rethink the relationship between Christianity, religion, and the secular. 
The Collegiants disrupt the secular claim to ahistoricity by exceeding and negating the 
opposition between religion and the secular, and showing how the association of reason with the 
secular was rooted in early Enlightenment Rationalism. 
 
66 
 
The Secular, Secularization, Secularism 
 Understanding the conceptual constellation of the secular, secularism, and secularization 
is important for the purpose of critiquing the supposed neutrality and ahistoricity of the concept 
of the secular. Any reference to secularity implicates the relationship between (1) the 
philosophical and theological concept of the secular, (2) the descriptively-oriented historical 
secularization thesis, and (3) the prescriptively-oriented political position of secularism. This 
tripartite description follows the work of sociologist José Casanova, who writes that 
"[r]ethinking secularism requires that we keep in mind the basic analytical distinction between 
'the secular' as a central modern epistemic category, 'secularization' as an analytical 
conceptualization of modern world-historical processes, and 'secularism' as a worldview and 
ideology."
234
 
 The concept of the secular is defined by its emphasis on worldly and temporal life 
concurrent with its rejection of religious categories. Put differently, although the secular is often 
defined by its negation of religion, it has also been defined by more positive characteristics such 
as an affirmation of worldly and temporal life rather than otherworldly or eternal life. The 
secular is a metaphysical and epistemological indicator that has a reciprocally constitutive 
relationship with both the historical secularization thesis, and the political ideology of 
secularism. Like Casanova, the cultural anthropologist and philosopher Talal Asad divides his 
book Formations of the Secular into the categories, secular, secularism, and secularization in an 
effort to address the question: "What is the relationship between 'the secular' as an epistemic 
category and 'secularism' as a political doctrine?"
235
 Although Asad is concerned with how the 
political aims of secularism are underwritten by the problematic way of knowing that the secular 
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promotes, this study is concerned with the ways in which the concept of the secular has its own 
genealogy informed by both political ideas about secularism, and historical ideas about 
secularization. 
 Being concerned with the concept of the secular requires understanding the discourse on 
the concept of the secular, the historical secularization thesis, and the political ideology of 
secularism. Each of these three parts of secularity have been critiqued from within their own 
discourses in the following ways: (1) the contemporary perspective of the postsecular in the 
Continental Philosophy of Religion challenges the philosophical and theological concept of the 
secular by critiquing the idea that the secular is a neutral ground that underpins the construction 
of religion, (2) the contemporary perspective of social differentiation challenges the descriptive 
and historical secularization thesis by accounting for the ways in which religion has remained an 
active force throughout the Enlightenment period, and (3) the political critique of secularism 
(postsecularism) challenges the prescriptively oriented political position of secularism by 
arguing for a political ethic that takes seriously both religious and secular interests in the public 
sphere. 
 
The Concept of the Secular 
 Although present theologies, philosophies, and critical theories each address the non-
neutrality of the secular with different vocabularies and epistemologies, each discourse critiques 
the assumption that by subtracting religion from both the public sphere and the state, the neutral 
ground of secularity can be achieved (an assumption characteristic of the New Atheism, to name 
68 
 
one example).
236
 Joining this trans-disciplinary effort to both historicize and problematize the 
secular, the present study challenges the assumption that the secular is the teleological 
culmination of the so-called progress brought by the Enlightenment. The disciplinary formations 
of theology, philosophy, and critical theory are each helpful in the aforementioned tasks, and 
these vocabularies call the concept of the secular into question from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives.  
The theological discourse that best informs the present postsecular inquiry is the debate 
between the Continental Philosophy of Religion and Radical Orthodoxy. Both perspectives 
critique the secular, holding that the secular is not a neutral perspective that is revealed when 
modern thinking attempted to clear away religious delusion. Furthermore, both perspectives 
understand the secular to be imagined, and therefore constructed, by modern consciousness. 
However, in critiquing the supposed neutrality of the secular, Radical Orthodoxy tends to posit 
the centrality of the Christian narrative in its place with an almost imperial force.
237
 Although it 
helpfully critiques the supposed neutrality of the secular, the perspective of Radical Orthodoxy 
reproduces the imposture that it critiques by triumphantly asserting the truth of Christianity over 
and against not only the secular, but against all other religions and perspectives. 
 On the other hand, the Continental Philosophy of Religion, as represented in the edited 
collection After the Postsecular and the Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of 
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Religion, critiques both the secular and religion, while also critiquing the violent methodology of 
Radical Orthodoxy. Whereas Radical Orthodoxy is concerned with maintaining the boundaries 
between theology and other disciplines, the Post-Secular Philosophy of Religion is concerned 
with treating these boundaries as always already intercontaminated. For Radical Orthodoxy the 
boundary between philosophy and theology, for example, is only permeable by theology, and 
only insofar as theology appropriates the vocabulary of philosophy for theological purposes. 
Milbank claims that "theology saves reason and fulfils and preserves philosophy, whereas 
philosophy left to itself, brings itself… to its own end."
238
 Contrary to this view, the position 
espoused by the postsecular Continental Philosophy of Religion risks the opposite discursive 
violence when it reacts to the misuse of philosophy by theologians. The editors of After the 
Postsecular and the Postmodern write that some contributors to the volume "chart the sometimes 
destructive effects of the recent theological contamination of philosophy" whereas others 
"experiment in the possibility of an aggressive alternative: a complementary philosophical 
contamination of theology."
239
On one hand some thinkers in the Continental Philosophy of 
Religion seek to insulate philosophy from the contaminant of theology ‒ a position that mirrors 
Radical Orthodoxy insofar as it fears that philosophy is a foreign contaminant instead of a 
dialogue partner. On the other hand, other contributors argue for "a complementary philosophical 
contamination of theology."
240
 It is this complementary position that I proceed from because it 
grants dignity to the explanatory and discursive disciplines of both philosophy and theology, and 
the perspective of religion and the secular. By putting the Collegiants in dialogue with one 
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particular but representative thinker in the Continental Philosophy of Religion (Daniel 
Colucciello Barber), I hope to seek the intercontamination of religion and the secular in such a 
way that avoids supremacy and triumphalism on either side. 
 
The Secularization Thesis 
 The concept of the secular has long rested upon the identification of the secular with 
reason, and the identification of reason with human progress. Connected with the idea that 
human progress corresponded with increasing rationality and increasing secularity, the thesis that 
long governed sociological thinking about the role of religion in the public sphere was that 
modernity entailed secularization. Secularization is a theory that describes social phenomena in 
the historical movement from early modernity to the present day, expecting that religious 
adherence would decline as industrial society progressed. The secularization thesis, as it has been 
called, has been contested on the grounds that the identification of secularization with 
modernization fails on two levels: the first flaw is that the secularization thesis contains an 
implicit normative element, and the second is that the secularization thesis does not correspond 
to the historical evidence.
241
 Instead of fading from view, religion has seen a resurgence, often 
continuing apace in new and differentiated manifestations. The secularization thesis has been 
contested on historical and sociological levels as simply not being reflective of the modern 
realities of religious adherence, and has been retracted by its main proponent, the sociologist 
Peter Berger, who states, "by the late 70s or early 80s—most, but not all, sociologists of religion 
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came to agree that the original secularization thesis was untenable in its basic form, which 
simply said modernization and secularization are necessarily correlated developments."
242
 
 In sociology, the idea that religion would decline as modernity progressed has recently 
given way to a sense that the identification of secularization with modernization was a mistake 
(exemplified in the work of sociologists José Casanova and David Martin).
243
 Instead, it has 
become evident that religion remains in various formations throughout the modern (or 
postmodern) world. The perspective of social differentiation accounts for this reality and 
appropriately critiques the secularization thesis. Whereas the original hypothesis of 
secularization maintained that there was a strict correspondence between the growth of industrial 
societies and the decline of religion, this new perspective of social differentiation provides a 
more nuanced explanation of the shifts in religious observance. 
 In his address at the Sixteenth Century Studies Conference in October 2014, "Religious 
Divisions After the Reformation: A Spur to Secularization?,"
244
 historian Benjamin Kaplan 
discussed analyses that link secularization and the Protestant Reformation, as exemplified by 
Brad Gregory's recent book The Unintended Reformation. Calling secularization "the master 
narrative of western history," Kaplan outlines three versions of the secularization thesis: (1) the 
decline and disappearance of religion, (2) the privatization and marginalization of religion, and 
(3) the differentiation of religion and its expressions.
245
 It is the last of these three variants on the 
secularization thesis that Kaplan addresses and takes seriously. Following David Martin's work 
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in his book On Secularization,246 Kaplan calls social differentiation "the viable core" of the 
secularization thesis, understanding social differentiation to be a movement towards the 
compartmentalization and privatization of the role of religion in the lives of its adherents. Social 
differentiation, as Kaplan understands it, involves a movement away from the ubiquitous 
influence of religion upon people's lives, meaning that the social role of religion no longer 
conditions the total experience of life. However, this exit of religion from both the political 
sphere and the public sphere does not necessarily entail the total loss of religion or its influence. 
Instead of decline, religion became differentiated and found new personal and corporate 
expressions without being marginalized. David Martin locates the beginnings of this theory in 
Talcott Parsons' work in the 1960s which understood social differentiation as the "separating out 
of each social sphere from ecclesiastical control" and he summarizes this perspective as "the 
increasing autonomy of the various spheres of human activity."
247
 This critique of the 
secularization thesis, and the resulting view that religion remains an influential cultural domain, 
further resists the conflation of reason and the secular, and challenges the narrative of human 
progress. The result of this critique is that the concept of the secular must be opened to more 
radical critique because arguments in support of secular epistemology can no longer rest on a 
descriptive historical sociology that once proclaimed the demise of religion.  
 
The Politics of Secularism 
 The three terms with which we are concerned ‒ the secular, secularism, and 
secularization ‒ determine one another in inconsistent and uneven ways. For example, the 
political consequence of the cultural acceptance of the secularization thesis is that arguments for 
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secular reason equate progress with the continuation of secularization. Most often, secularism is 
a prescriptive political doctrine that seeks to prevent religious influence in the political sphere, 
and to a lesser degree in the public sphere. This position is seen most clearly in the domestic 
policy of a nation such as France. Defined by a sharp distinction between the religious and 
political spheres, in France the normative ethic of laïcité (secularity) extends to a ban on 
religious garb (such as the hijab) in French public schools.
248
 And yet, secularism is not a 
singular politic. Instead, secularism is as interiorly diverse as the concept of the secular. Some 
varieties of secularism merely seek to maintain strong boundaries between the religious and 
public spheres, while others (such as the aforementioned example) actively seek to eliminate the 
influence of religion on the policies of the state. 
 The philosopher Jürgen Habermas critiques the political program of secularism from the 
standpoint of post-secularism, which calls into question the conceptual underpinning of the 
secularist position. Habermas opposes the dominance of secularism in the political sphere and 
argues for a political ethic that takes seriously both religious and secular interests in the public 
sphere. Habermas writes that "[t]he awareness of living in a secular society is no longer bound 
up with the certainty that cultural and social modernization can advance only at the cost of the 
public influence and personal relevance of religion."
249
 This description of postsecular society is 
matched with a critique of the polarization that Habermas describes as "a cultural relativism 
beefed up with a critique of reason on the one side, and a rigid secularism pushing for a critique 
of religion on the other."
250
 The way out of this impasse, for Habermas, is not the relegation of 
religion to the private sphere (as in the case of French laïcité), and not merely increasing the 
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political influence of religious minorities. Instead, Habermas argues for a "learning process" on 
the side of both the secular and the religious.
251
 This learning process involves just the sort of 
mutual recognition that was argued for above in the debate on the status of the secular as a 
theological and philosophical concept. It is this spirit of dialogue between supposedly 
incommensurable ideas that the Collegiants embody, and so the remainder of this study will 
show how the Collegiant group exemplifies the critiques of the secular outlined above. 
 
The Collegiants, the Secular, and the World 
 In his programmatic article "Postsecularism," Anthony Paul Smith writes that "in order to 
understand the postsecular we are led from the get go to the question of the secular."
252
 
Beginning to define the term, Smith writes that "the postsecular first names the relativizing of the 
secular."
253
 Smith defines the secular as a kind of colonial and imperial power, and he defines the 
postsecular as a critical resistance to that power. For Smith, "[t]he postsecular is parasitic upon 
the secular."
254
 This parasitism is definitive because the postsecular both depends upon and 
stands against the secular.
255
 Furthermore, Smith draws upon the work of Talal Asad, by first 
distinguishing between the concept of the secular and the political doctrine of secularism, and 
then by sharing in Asad's argument that the "'the secular' is conceptually prior to the political 
doctrine of 'secularism.'"
256
 This is what Smith refers to as "the conjugated secular," in other 
words the "naming the conjugation of the epistemological concept and the political project."
257
 
 This postsecular critique finds its most sophisticated contemporary expression in the 
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work of Daniel Colucciello Barber, most recently a fellow at the ICI Berlin Institute for Cultural 
Inquiry. Neither a philosopher nor theologian proper, Barber mediates and combines the critical 
grammars of philosophy and theology in two major works (On Diaspora in 2011 and Deleuze 
and the Naming of God in 2014), and in a series of articles and critical reviews.258 The work of 
Barber represents the more balanced perspective within the Continental Philosophy of Religion. 
Although the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy greatly risk repeating the problems that they 
themselves critique (proclamations of neutrality and victory), and some thinkers in the 
postsecular Continental Philosophy of Religion repeat this problem in reverse (seeking to 
insulate philosophy from theological contamination), Barber affirms secular and religious truths 
without presuming that he does so from a neutral ground outside of the influence of both 
perspectives.
259
 
 For Barber, the secular is certainly something invented or imagined, and so his critique 
can be readily categorized as postsecular. This "invention of the secular" is critiqued by Barber 
because it engages in "the installation of a transcendent plane that, in presenting itself as a 
universal aim, enables the hegemony of a particular position."
260
 This passage exemplifies the 
way in which Barber's position is defined by his commitments to world-affirmation, immanence, 
and the critique of transcendence. For Barber and his interlocutors Talal Asad and Gil Anidjar, 
the goal is to affirm the dignity of the world without privileging a particular way of naming that 
world, and thereby exercising a discursive power play.  
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 This formulation contains an implicit linkage of epistemology, ontology, and ethics. 
Barber's ethics rests on the critique of power, and evaluates ontological and epistemological 
claims based on whether discursive power is abused or used well. For example, colonial and 
imperial ways of knowing damage epistemological and ontological claims by dehumanizing 
individuals or cultural and religious groups. Barber's epistemology rests on the idea that right 
knowing can only follow from a dialogical understanding of discourse rather than an adversarial 
model that would dominate less powerful perspectives. Ways of knowing that are hegemonic 
tend to proceed from the assumption of their own victory, and therefore reduce and sometimes 
oppress minority perspectives. This epistemological ethics correlates with ontology through the 
act of naming. When we assign a name (signifier) to a thing in the world (signified) we are not 
only engaging in an epistemological action of knowing, but we are doing something both 
politically and ontologically significant. Barber's critique of power extends to ontology through 
his affirmation of the world (the signified thing that is named) over and against the names that 
we assign to things in the world. Barber's wants to ensure that the worldly thing that is named 
remains more primary than the name assigned to it, and this is what he means when he refers to 
world-affirmation. This is because what is named is infinitely richer than names can contain, 
meaning that the thing exceeds the name and the name does not exhaust the thing it describes. 
The immanence of the worldly thing must always come before the transcendental discourses that 
seek to limit that immanence with imperialistic and colonial ways of naming. The criteria of 
world-affirmation is applied all across the board for Barber, meaning that both established 
religion and established secularity are found to be deficient because both set themselves up as 
transcendental worldviews that seek hegemony over the world that they attempt to explain and 
engage with.
261
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 Both Radical Orthodoxy and the Continental Philosophy of Religion quite rightly critique 
the claim that the secular is ahistorical and neutral, although they draw different conclusions 
from this critique. A consequence of the critique of both Radical Orthodoxy and the Continental 
Philosophy of Religion is that, because the secular is not a neutral base-line, we are not able to 
simply position ourselves against it (from a confessional 'religious' position), and we are not able 
to build a thought-world upon it (from a nonconfessional 'secular' position). Acknowledgment of 
these two parallel critiques forms the basis on which Barber builds his theory. 
 
Diaspora 
 Neither concerned for nor restrained by the concerns of philosophy or theology, Barber’s  
first major work focuses on the topic of 'diaspora.' Typically naming the remnant of a displaced 
people group, and connoting a connection to the people of Israel (when used in the context of 
Christian theology), diaspora takes on a new meaning in Barber's work. Diaspora names a way of 
thinking, a way of understanding, and an ontology, that acts as "a concept and not a sociological 
descriptor."
262
 Barber distinguishes between understanding diaspora as a characteristic of a 
particular thing and understanding diaspora as a determiner of being and existence, and he 
develops this ontology of diaspora through both a unique philosophy of immanence and an 
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exploration of "Christianity, religion, and the secular."
263
 In order to understand Barber's 
postsecular position it is vital to first understand his concepts of diaspora and immanence. 
 For Barber. "diasporic immanence" names an ontological theory in which "the cause of 
being and the effects of being…belong to the same plane."
264
 This ontological view removes any 
transcendental reference point and places all causes and effects on the same level in which "each 
being is co-constitutive of every other being."
265
 The result of this emphasis on immanence is the 
tension between "namelessness" and "excessive signification."
266
 While namelessness refers to 
the aforementioned idea that it is impossible to assign a proper name to particular beings or 
being-as-such, Barber admits that it is nonetheless necessary to engage in the act of naming both 
being-itself and particular beings. Excessive signification refers to the aforementioned idea that, 
while names can be assigned to particular beings or being-itself, these names do not exhaust 
what they signify. Each name is a reduction, meaning that the 'world' that is signified always 
exceeds the name that is signifying. For Barber, namelessness and excessive signification are 
related by a "reciprocal relay" that is generative and creative, provided that it does not crystallize 
into either the rejection of naming or an over-confidence in naming.
267
  
 Barber holds that immanence "begins as a manner or relation… in which neither term can 
be made utterly prior to the other."
268
 Rather than accepting a relation between immanence and 
transcendence that subordinates the immanence of the world to a transcendental reference point, 
Barber understands an immanent relation to be one in which the two terms are "mutually 
constitutive."
269
 Instead of privileging cause over effect, for Barber "the being of the cause and 
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the being of the effects belong to one plane of immanence."
270
 Being "irreducible and 
autonomous," immanence expresses itself in such a way that problematizes the procedure of 
assigning a name to a particular identity (such as the world), so much so that "immanence, 
properly speaking, is nameless" despite the unavoidable nature of naming.
271
 Barber is also 
concerned to avoid setting up namelessness as a transcendental criterion for all phenomena. 
Namelessness is not a rule that seeks to prevent any confidence in naming, but rather it is a 
paradox in which the imagined or "fictive" nature of all names stands in immanent relation with 
the excessive and irreducible nature of the world that human beings attempt to name.
272
 The two 
dangers of immanence then, are "letting namelessness transcend names" and "making names 
transcendent to the nameless."
273
 Letting namelessness transcend names results in a kind of 
paralysis in which we stop naming things because names place such restrictive limits on things. 
On the other hand, making names transcendent to the nameless falls into the trap of misusing 
epistemological power by setting up particular names as final and complete signifiers of that 
which they signify. In addition informing his work on Christianity, religion, and the secular, this 
critical vocabulary also assists Barber in his interdisciplinary mediation between philosophy and 
theology. 
 Mediating between the discourses of philosophy and theology, Barber develops a 
typology that explains the problems and potentials of both perspectives. First, Barber defines 
"Philosophical Delimitation" as the "primacy of a purely philosophical structure" which 
subordinates theology to philosophy.
274
 In this view "theological discourse is understood as a 
specific borrowing or deployment of a more fundamental and generic mode of thought that is 
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properly philosophical."
275
 Second, Barber defines "Theological Particularism" as "the primacy 
of theological discourse in its particularity."
276
 This view refuses to argue from a fundamental 
transcendental position, instead affirming the inherently subjective nature of theological 
assertion. Third, Barber defines "Theological Ontology" as the position that holds that "the desire 
to think being, or any universal horizon, is to be affirmed, but that this desire may only be 
fulfilled through theological discourse."
277
 
 Barber critiques each position, stating first that his standard of immanence accords with 
the critique of transcendence of Theological Particularism, but notes the tendency of Theological 
Particularism to forget that the system of signification that it rests upon is "fictive" and 
"contingent."
278
 Second, Barber's key category of immanence aligns with the perspective of 
Philosophical Delimitation on a basic level because it positions itself theologically in relation to 
philosophy, but Barber holds that Philosophical Delimitation falls short when it sets up 
philosophy as the arbiter of truth over theology.
279
 Lastly, Barber's perspective of immanence 
appreciates the corrective that Theological Ontology provides for Theological Particularism, but 
he cannot follow Theological Ontology all the way because it rests upon the same sort of 
transcendent assurance as Philosophical Delimitation.
280
 This discursive critique of philosophy 
and theology, which owes a great deal to the suspicion of power characteristic of the postmodern 
perspective, is analogous to his critique of Christianity and the secular. 
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Christianity 
 This ontological view of the relationship between being, language, and immanence 
undergirds Barber's postsecular position in such a way that permits him to be critical of both 
theology and philosophy, and religion and the secular. To see the relationship between 
Christianity, religion, and the secular through the lens of diaspora is to affirm the creative and 
constructive good of difference. In other words, a diasporic view of Christianity, religion, and the 
secular is "to see differentiality as an advantage" because "if Christianity is diasporic then it can 
never exist in isolation from its others" (such as the other Abrahamic faiths and the varieties of 
atheism and agnosticism).
281
 Instead of understanding otherness and difference as enemies of 
identity, Barber argues that both Christianity and the secular must understand that what they 
have named 'Christianity' and 'the secular' exceeds the boundaries of those names. Barber seeks 
to "propose a diasporic account of Christianity without simultaneously claiming that this 
diasporic Christianity accords with some ahistorical essence of Christianity."
282
 In this way he 
avoids setting up historical essence as a transcendental reference point and measure, thereby 
linking his critique of transcendence with his ontological position. Barber writes that, 
immanence insists on the proper namelessness of being, it also insists on the excessive, 
improper signification that is produced with the same necessity by which being remains 
nameless. Any discourse on Christianity, then, should be understood as an instance of this 
signification that is both improper to the namelessness of immanence and constructively 
expressive of the very same immanence.
283
 
 
For Barber, being itself cannot be contained or exhausted by names. Because of this ontological 
claim, Christianity is not a master narrative with privileged access to the immanent world, but 
rather Christianity is one discourse and narrative alongside others such as the secular, or the 
other Abrahamic faiths. Proceeding with an implementation of his diasporic approach, Barber 
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concerns himself with the conceptual lineage "from the Christian invention of religion to the 
modern opposition between religion and the secular."
284
 Barber argues that the apostle Paul's 
institutionalization of Christianity under the indistinction "neither Jew nor Greek" fundamentally 
and irreversibly changed the meaning of the category of religion.
285
 Barber writes that, after 
Paul, "[r]eligion no longer names the practices that mediate a certain ethno-cultural existence; it 
begins instead to name one's relation to a newly born spiritual plane," and this plane is 
Christianity.
286
 The newfound ability to be a follower of Christ in spite of cultural identity (Jew 
or Greek), means that a new category has to be invented, a category that we call religion.
287
 
Barber writes, with reference to Daniel Boyarin's book Border Lines,288 that Christianity sets 
itself up as the fulfillment of the category that it has necessitated: "the distinctive characteristic 
of true religion is right belief ‒ in other words, orthodoxy. Christianity, as it becomes a new kind 
of identity, carries with it a new way of defining identity."
289
 The boundaries that define 
Christian belief in modern Protestantism often rest on the distinction between orthodoxy and 
heresy
290
 ‒ a distinction that is fixated on the personal assent to propositional truth-statements. 
This simplistic binary situation, set up by the emphasis on right belief and truth against heresy 
and heterodoxy, is symptomatic of a deep power problem ‒ the very same power problem that 
Barber critiques philosophically when he affirms immanence and critiques transcendence.  
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The Secular and the Postsecular 
 Barber's understanding of the relationship between Christianity, religion, and the secular 
is essential if we are to understand his postsecular position, and his critique of the secular. Barber 
writes that  
Christianity established itself by establishing religion (such that it became the fulfillment 
of religion); the secular established itself by opposing itself to religion and thus to 
Christianity as well (though in a problematically equivocal sense). I argue that the secular 
should be seen not as a successful resolution of these prior inconsistencies, but rather as 
yet another innovation in a series of inconsistencies.
291
  
 
In the same way that Barber describes the Christian invention of religion (via Boyarin), he also 
describes the invention of the secular. Barber critiques both positions, in a way similar to 
Foucault's critique of Enlightenment blackmail, because they set up "a position of judgment" and 
a transcendent "plane of reality in which such a position becomes normative."
292
 He calls this the 
"fundamental continuity between Christian religion and the secular," noting that, while the 
content of the two differs, the epistemic mode of assertion remains the same.
293
 Barber critiques 
the idea that "the secular functions to emancipate us from Christianity or from religion as such" 
and instead argues that both the secular and the religious fail to provide an "immanent 
affirmation of the world" by virtue of their transcendental imposture.
294
 The affirmation of the 
world that Barber argues for is a kind of affirmation that seeks to understand the world without 
dominating it by using names to limit and quash the excesses of what they name.  
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World-Affirmation 
 In his review "The Act of Criticism and the Secular" Barber states that "the secular 
cannot function as an unproblematic point of reference."
295
 Barber then outlines several possible 
critical directions after the critique of the secular. He writes that some thinkers critique the 
secular because of its complicity in "colonial, imperial, and racial modes of power," while others 
state that "the value of the secular ultimately resides in its critical power" (such as in the book by 
Stathis Gourgouris that Barber reviews).
296
 Amongst these options, the discourses and 
vocabularies that both religion and the secular use to name the world each have an inherent 
dignity.
297
 This conviction aligns with both the Collegiant commitment to diversity and tolerance 
and with Barber's critique of the misuse of discursive power in the transcendental postures taken 
up by both religion and the secular. In particular, both Barber's critique and the openness of 
Collegiant discourse are aligned on the question of what defines the world. 
 The trajectory of Collegiant thought moved through several discrete attitudes pertaining 
to the affirmation of the world. Whereas the early Spiritualist Collegiants rejected the present 
world because of their millenarian apocalyptic expectation, Collegiant Rational Religion 
significantly affirmed the world of culture and society. Collegiant Rational Religion critiqued 
confessional boundaries, rejecting confessions in a way that is philosophically similar to Barber's 
rejection of discourses that arrange themselves as transcendental measures of other discourses. 
Whereas Collegiant Rational Religion aligns with Barber's world-affirmation, the later 
Collegiant Rationalism falls under Barber's critique of transcendence because of way 
Rationalism sets up reason as a dominant category. Those who advised Bredenburg to choose 
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between Spiritualist faith and Rationalist reason reinforced the authority of the dominant 
discourse of Rationalism. Toward the end of the history of the Collegiant group, this dominant 
discourse of Rationalism began to see itself as incommensurable with Christian faith. This is 
partially exemplified by Zwicker's rule of distinction in which "[i]t is impossible to predicate two 
contrary things of one subject at the same time."
298
 For Zwicker these two contrary things were 
the two natures of Christ. However, this principle represents a larger movement in Collegiant 
thought away from compatibility toward incommensurability. 
 Collegiant Rational Religion combines two viewpoints that today we understand to be 
separate. In the same spirit as Collegiant Rational Religion, Barber seeks to show how 
Christianity and the secular are both already unified by their concern for the world. Barber 
critiques both contemporary secular and religious perspectives for their failure to be truly world-
affirming by pointing out how both proceed from the assumption that their position is the neutral 
ground of reality, when each perspective is in fact constructing itself as a transcendent standard. 
In his essay "Epistemological Violence, Christianity, and the Secular" Barber writes that the 
work of Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder has been well recognized for its political 
potential, but not for its radical affirmation of the secular as the site of the gospel. Despite the 
fact that the term "secular" is used in opposition to the "church" in Yoder's work, Barber 
describes the way in which Yoder affirms the original secular meaning of the term 'gospel' as 
'good news' or evangelion. Barber argues that, 
primacy must be granted to the secular, and that the opposition between religious and 
secular occludes theological truth.  Faced with such an opposition, theology sides with 
the secular, because at bottom the secular retains—at least in this instance—two qualities 
that are essential to the gospel: that it is good news for the world, and that it is good news 
for people in general rather than for private individuals....
299
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Here Barber associates both the secular and the religious with the goal of world-affirmation, via 
the gospel. Because of the world-oriented nature of the gospel, Barber claims that Christianity is 
faithful when it affirms the good that the secular seeks to name (but not in such a way that 
positions Christian discourse as the transcendental assurance of a final name). For Barber, the 
secular cannot be rightly identified with reason because reason is so often used as an absolute 
reference point against which every particular claim must position itself. Instead, Barber 
decouples the secular from reason, claiming instead that the secular represents an attempt at 
naming the world that is outside of the language of religion.  
 The radical move that Barber makes occurs when he joins together Christianity and the 
secular by showing how the true concern of both perspectives is "the world." Holding both 
Christianity and the secular to the same standard of world-affirmation, Barber seeks to assure 
that the affirmation of the world is pursued in such a way that places the richness of the object of 
concern before the limits or excesses of the names that are assigned to it. This concern for the 
object rather than the name is very much in line with both the Collegiant spirit of 
anticonfessionalism, and the Collegiant rejection of the idea of the one true church. Kołakowski 
writes that the Collegiants "have taken anticonfessionalism to its most highly developed form 
and do not regard themselves as bound by even irenic 'general Christianity,' but want to conduct 
their religious life their own way, independent of all collective names."
300
 This Collegiant desire 
to be free of names further accords with Barber's critique of namelessness and excessive 
signification. 
 Barber affirms that the secular is the concern of the religious, and being its concern, the 
secular should be affirmed by the religious. He writes that "what matters for theology is the 
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world—though this is not the same as saying that theology affirms the world as it is presently 
expressed, given that the community of disciples is distinct by way of its nonconformity with 
preestablished patterns of existence."
301
 Barber states that "[t]o affirm immanence is not to affirm 
the below against the beyond, it is to refuse such an opposition."
302
 Being world-affirming, 
therefore, is not a wholesale assent to the injustices and violence in the world, but rather an 
attempt to problematize the boundary between religious names and secular names, and to show 
that these vocabularies overlap in both their metaphysical object and in their political goals.  
 Barber writes that "the conceptual opposition between the secular and the religious must 
be displaced" especially given that "secularism tends to present us with a false binary whereby 
we must choose either the restriction of religion or the potentiality for becoming opened up by 
the liberation from religion."
303
 The Collegiants displaced this distinction between the secular 
and religion in the seventeenth century by combining the mystical inner life of Spiritualism with 
the Rationalism of Spinoza.  
 Pieter Balling's work, The Light on the Candle Stick, serves as a striking example of this 
combination. A representative selection reads: 
Things are not for words, but words for things ‒ if therefore we understand things aright 
and as they ought, by words, it must be by such as are fit to imprint the things themselves 
in those to whom they should occur, and then it were enough (to make known our 
thoughts to others as we conceive them) only to make use of such words. But forasmuch 
as we find the matter in this case far otherwise, and that two men speaking or writing the 
same words, may nevertheless have different, yea, sometimes contrary thoughts, the 
disability of performing this fitly by words or discourse, is clearly inferred. Nor may we 
at all wonder at it, seeing we know to what a perpetual change languages are subject, 
even such that the very words may be changed from their pristine signification. And the 
imperfection is so great, that whosoever should have invented them, such as now they are 
in use, we should certainly believe that he had little or no knowledge of those things that 
are thereby intended to be signified. So that if we would better express things unto 
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another by words and speeches, we had need find new words, and consequently a whole 
new language: But that would be a toyle and labour indeed.
304
 
 
Balling emphasizes that the purpose of words is to name things, assuring the reader that 
limitations and contradictions in language are to be expected. Rather than resulting in a "pristine 
signification," words are imperfect vessels that are invented by the ignorant and reinvented as 
needed. Barber's reciprocal relay between namelessness and excessive signification serves the 
same purpose as the passage from Balling, namely to assert the fictive and constructed nature of 
language. Common to both Barber and Balling is the idea that the proper concern of language is 
the world. Barber upholds world-affirmation, and Balling states correspondingly that words are 
for things and not the other way around. Applied to the discourse on the secular, whereas the 
secular indicates a concern for the world, both Barber and Balling seek to align language with 
the immanence of things in the world, rather than reducing things in the world to the limits of a 
fixed transcendental vocabulary such as religion or the secular. In this way both the aims of 
Balling and other Rational-Religious Collegiants, and the aims of Barber's project, have 
contemporary consequences for postsecular discourse. 
 
Giving up Universality 
 Another way in which Barber's critique aligns with the historical example of the 
Collegiants is found in the fact that the Collegiants intentionally divested themselves of the claim 
that they were the universal church, therefore separating themselves from the transcendental 
posture of power that Barber critiques. In their early period, the Collegiants remained confident 
in the inherent rightness of their own position, in such a way that would not stand up to Barber's 
critique of epistemological violence. However, as the Collegiants developed their form of 
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Rational Religion, their critique of church and world remained, but their toleration of different 
beliefs increased in tandem with their rejection of confessions.  
 Kołakowski was interested in the Collegiants for this very reason, and he contrasts 
religious groups that are defined by exclusivity with religious groups that are defined by 
openness or acceptance. Proposing a refined typology of religious groups, Kołakowski argues 
that the Collegiants hold a unique position in the sect-church distinction, and joins in the 
tradition in the history of ideas of theorizing the sect-type established by Ernst Troeltsch and 
Max Weber. Troeltsch's influential distinction between church and sect is that, 
The Church is that type of organization which is overwhelmingly conservative, which to 
a certain extent accepts the secular order, and dominates the masses; in principle; 
therefore, it is universal, i.e. it desires to cover the whole life of humanity. The sects, on 
the other hand are comparatively small groups; they aspire after personal inward 
perfection, and they aim at a direct personal fellowship between the members of each 
group. From the very beginning, therefore, they are forced to organize themselves in 
small groups, and to renounce the idea of dominating the world. Their attitude towards 
the world, the State, and Society may be indifferent, tolerant, or hostile, since they have 
no desire to control and incorporate these forms of social life; on the contrary, they tend 
to avoid them....
305
 
 
For Troeltsch the church-type seeks to conserve itself by claiming universality, whereas the sects 
do not strive for self-preservation and instead seek inward spiritual perfection. Defined by their 
being a gathered community, the sects "renounce the idea of dominating the world."
306
 This 
definition is characteristic of the Collegiant group, given their sectarian ancestry, communal 
focus, and intentional denial of the presence of the one true church in the world. The free church 
avoidance of state control, and the "indifferent, tolerant, or hostile" attitude taken towards "the 
world" is characteristic of the Collegiant early period. In this case the "world" indicates the realm 
of the state, but also defines the more general desire for domination and control that defines the 
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church-type. Troeltsch's typology aligns, on this point, with that of Weber when he defines the 
Anabaptists in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
A strict avoidance of the world, in the sense of all not strictly necessary intercourse with 
worldly people, together with the strictest bibliocracy in the sense of taking the life of the 
first generations of Christians as a model, were the results for the first Baptist 
communities, and this principle of avoidance of the world never quite disappeared so 
long as the old spirit remained alive.
307
 
 
Again, the rejection of the world remains definitive of the free church tradition insofar as the 
world refers to the state and that which is detestable in culture. Troeltsch's definition of the 
church and sect types is important because of how the critique of power begins to manifest itself 
in the refusal of the one true church, as exemplified by Collegiant leaders such as Galenus. 
 Like Troeltsch and Weber, Kołakowski theorizes a similar distinction between inclusive 
and exclusive Christian groups. On one hand there are groups that believe themselves to hold 
exclusive access to the divine, and these groups are defined by their claim to be the one true 
church. On the other hand there are groups that "consciously give up any claim to being the 'one 
true church,' and state this position in no uncertain terms."
308
 Kołakowski proposes "a division of 
Christian sects into those which are exclusive and those which are not. In this case 'exclusive' 
refers to those who believe that they are the 'one true church,' while those that are not exclusive 
are those who reject this assertion."
309
 This proposal comes just before his claim that "[t]he 
Collegiant movement embodies the highest social level of nonexclusive religious 
consciousness."
310
  
 In this context, Kołakowski's claim is even more powerful. Not only does the Collegiant 
group represent a significant inclusiveness, but as was argued earlier, this inclusiveness remains 
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properly definitive of the group.  The Collegiants intentionally gave up claims to universality, 
making them an important historical correlate to Barber's critique of discourses that proceed 
from a transcendent position of power. Barber implicitly critiques the objectivity favored by the 
church-type, and affirms the subjectivity favored by the sect-type. The Collegiants serve as an 
ideal example of the sect-type because part of their identity is the divestment of all claims to 
universality, whether in confessions or in the claim to be the one true church. 
 
Church and World 
 A final example of the connection between Barber's work and the Collegiants is found in 
Galenus' encouragement to the church to resist the temptation to "become immanent" or 
"transform itself into a monster cut off from the rest of the world, content to cultivate its own 
perfection."
311
 This world-affirming perspective is certainly more in line with the values of the 
Enlightenment and Modernity than a separatist or purist treatment of the two-worlds model.
312
 
For Galenus the ideal form of Christian faith is, in the words of Kołakowski, "completely 
reduced to moral functions, but also unrestrained as an educational institution which aspired to 
external activity, enlivened by the apostolic spirit but free of fanaticism."
313
 This shows that the 
secularization of religious truth is certainly operative in the reduction of faith to morality, and 
this affects how the divide between church and world functioned for Galenus. A more nuanced 
distinction between the church and the world also found in the work of Galenus is helpful in dis-
identifying Enlightenment from secularization because it shows further how the term 'world' has 
many meanings. Kołakowski writes further that, 
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For Galenus, the word "world"—in the pejorative sense, mundus immundus—refers to 
godless and evil people and their actions, but not natural reality, as such. If one 
understands in this way the call to "separate oneself from the world" and to feel sympathy 
for the "spirit of the world" which has penetrated into the reformed churches, then it is 
easy to understand that these do not refer to the program of a sect which turns away from 
all "worldly" arrangements with scorn. It likewise does not mean one turns away from 
social life and everyday work and attempts to cultivate spiritual qualities in ascetic 
practices.
314
 
 
This attitude, which is a kind of secularity, nuances Galenus' position on the distinction between 
church and world because it allows the separation of the meaning of the word 'world' into the 
positive role of culture, and the negative moral term of evil. This allows for a positive 
understanding of culture without a wholesale encouragement of "godless and evil people and 
their actions."
315
 
 More broadly, Kołakowski identifies two streams in the Protestant mindset: "the 
condemnation of the 'world' along with the ecclesiastical institutions, and the opening up of the 
ecclesiastical institutions to the 'world' by giving them a secular character."
316
 Although the 
former tendency is evident in the early Collegiant attitude toward the world, the latter is 
representative of Collegiant Rational Religion and its affirmation of the worlds of culture, 
science, and politics. This affirmation of the worlds of culture, science, and politics is what gives 
the Collegiant group their depth and breadth, allowing them to challenge contemporary thinking 
by demonstrating that religion and the secular can indeed be understood as complementary 
perspectives that mutually fulfill one another.  
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Conclusion 
 The Collegiants were a hinge between the Christian worldview of the Reformation era 
and the so-called "secular" worldview of the Early Enlightenment. Being at this juncture the 
Collegiants demonstrated how these two perspectives could be held together, at least for a time. 
The Collegiants are instructive for contemporary thinking about the divide between religion and 
the secular because they demonstrate how a community can be both religious and secular at the 
same time. The Rational Religion that developed midway through Collegiant history is often 
passed over in the scholarship on the group, but the teleological inevitability of the victory of 
reason does not adequately describe the Collegiant movement, especially given the critique of 
the Enlightenment periodization provided by both the critique of Israel and the critique of 
Enlightenment thinking from Kant to the Frankfurt School. These two concurrent critiques ‒ one 
historiographical and one philosophical ‒ help to situate the importance of Collegiant Rational 
Religion in the scholarship on the Radical Enlightenment.  
 In their development of Rational Religion, the Collegiants were defined by interior 
diversity, anticonfessionalism, anticlericalism, and free prophecy. These defining characteristics, 
which accord significantly with contemporary postsecular critique, were lost in the transition to 
Rationalism. Instead of emphasizing the compatibility between faith and reason that permitted 
the Dutch Mennonite and Spinozan connections, Collegiant thought eventually embraced the 
aspect of Rationalism that privileged distinctions rather than compatibilities. The Bredenburg 
dispute marked a turning point in which Rationalism superseded Rational Religion in the 
Collegiant group. The particular moment when Bredenburg was forced to choose between faith 
and reason exemplified the greater principle that Zwicker called the rule of distinction, a rule that 
94 
 
emphasized disjunction over conjunction, and the rule of reason over the compatibility of faith 
and reason.  
 The story of the Collegiants resonates with contemporary postsecular critique, as 
represented by the thought of Daniel Coluciello Barber. Understanding that the secular is 
intertwined with secularization and secularism (and the critiques of secularization and 
secularism), the Collegiants align well with the present postsecular critique because of their 
affirmation of the world, their divestment from claims to universality, and their suspicion of 
names. Kołakowski writes that the Collegiant movement "proclaims itself a secular institution, 
called to strengthen collectively its religious values, but deprived of any charismatic glory of a 
religious group in its ideas, activities and rituals."
317
 However, the secular nature of the 
Collegiant group goes deeper than their lack of charismatic glory. Given Barber's argument that 
both the secular and religion are faithful when they affirm the immanent world before any 
transcendent names, it is surely the case that the Collegiants are secular in this deeper sense, and 
also religious in this deeper sense. As a group that functioned as a "loose association" and a 
"fluid framework" the Collegiants speak directly into present conversations about pluralism, 
tolerance, and multiculturalism.
318
 In the present postmodern situation, characterized by the 
collapse of grand narratives,
319
 there can be no better resource for understanding the crumbling 
distinction between religion and the secular than the Collegiant group who combined religion 
and secularity over 350 years ago. Because they were a self-avowedly Christian and secular 
organization the Collegiants teach us that the secular is historical and not value neutral, and that 
we have never been purely secular.  
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